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An Idea of American Indian Land Justice:
Examining Native Land Liberation in the New Progressive Era
By Richael Faithful
Introduction
Celebrated contemporary political philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, in the
introductory chapter of his recent work, The Idea of Justice,1 describes a classical distinction in
East Indian2 jurisprudence between niti and nyaya. Niti is represented by matsyanyaya or ―justice
in the world of fish,‖ and nyaya represents whole justice.3 Matsyanyaya, according to his
narrative, is justice where fish may freely swim but large fish dominate the water because they
are free to devour smaller fish.4 East Indian legal theorists rebuke matsyanyaya for the reason
that a world of this kind—where smaller fish are inevitably endangered for the mere reason that
they are small—seems intuitively unfair.5 Matsyanyaya, they argue, suggests that justice is a
purely personal matter that hinges on individual moral choices. But, they ask, is not justice
something more? This ―something‖ is embodied by a concept known as nyaya. Nyaya reflects
societies‘ willingness to judge themselves as well as their principles, institutions, and conduct in
relation to justice. These East Indian thinkers believe that nyaya ought to represent justice in the
world of humans, for it is justice that makes up the metaphorical water in which we humans
swim.
1

AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 20 (2009) (advancing a political theory of justice developed from decades‘
critiques of John Rawls‘ preeminent theory of justice).
2

This article compares ideas from continental Indian philosopher Amartya Sen and American Indian scholar, Robert
Odawi Porter. To avoid confusion, I will designate ―East Indian‖ for continental India and ―American Indian‖ for
American Indian tribes.
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.
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In the Tewa tribal tradition there is a story that explains how the Tewa People found
themselves in San Juan, California. It begins with a Great Drought.6 The fish people were
responsible for offering prayers to the Great Spirit, so they assembled to fast, pray, and sacrifice
in a secluded kiva until the rain came as was custom. A woman named Fee-ne-nee was
responsible for their daily feeding.7 On the third night, one of the men could no longer stand the
isolation, and suffering from thirst, secretly left to the nearby lake, and drank until he could do so
no more.8 He quietly returned to the fish people, but his water-filled body burst when he entered
the kiva.9 Water poured out of his head, eyes, mouth, arms, body, and legs—soon the other fish
people turned into fish, frogs, and other water animals.10 The next day when Fee-ne-nee arrived,
she saw water gushing into the air and water animals swimming in the torrent.11 She returned to
the village to the first house she saw, home to an old man and wife.12 When she entered the
house she turned into a snake.13 The old woman and man knew that something happened at the
kiva and that this was a bad omen for the village people.14 After placing the young woman in a

6

AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 415 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso Ortiz, eds. 1984).
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snake burrow east of the village, the old couple returned, crying.15 They told their people that the
law required them to move from their home, O-Ke-owin, and find another place to live.16
Justice and displacement are intractable cultural themes that continue to be enormously
relevant today. What is fair is strongly correlated to the story of where people are and how they
got there. This Tewa story contains a tangled historical tapestry for America‘s First Peoples who,
in large part, have been displaced from their ancestral lands to places unlike their homes. The
Tewa story tells about a certain kind of displacement, one which is dictated by the Great Spirit‘s
law. But many other American Indian displacement stories tell about ―justice in the world of
fish‖ where tribes were forced or pressured into leaving their homelands by invaders. In this
way, East Indian philosophy is connected to American Indian history because both narratives
meet at a universal-political theology. The spiritual and political commitment to liberation, as
well as the legal and ethical commitment to justice, is long-sought by peoples throughout the
world. Relating among strains of justice-seeking traditions—Indian, Euro-Western, and
American Indian—is crucial for universal improvement toward justice.
I would like to discuss the matter of justice in this spirit. This article aims to achieve two
goals: to begin articulating American Indian land justice policy proposals as we approach a
progressive horizon, and to re-ignite advocates‘ imagination about land justice to usher
movement toward the horizon. The article also contains two levels of analyses. On the first level,
it examines connections between a contemporary theory of justice, developed by East Indian
thinker, Amartya Sen, and an emerging American Indian law land-justice proposal, introduced
by American Indian law scholar, Robert Odawi Porter. This comparison shows how Western
15

Id.

16

AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 416 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso Ortiz, eds. 1984).

4

justice theoretical developments parallel existing American Indian justice theory and how these
theories can mutually inform each other.17 On the second level, this article further investigates
Professor Porter‘s legal vision called ―land liberation,‖18 as a vehicle to realize American Indian
justice. I argue that we must recognize new opportunities to deliver justice as they emerge, like
land liberation, while the global-political climate around justice quickly transforms. This article
re-visits American Indian land rights‘ discussions on moral entitlements, judicial autonomy, and
tribal sovereignty in a changing socio-political, human rights context, during which the potential
for land justice is as ripe as ever.
Part I of this article generally maps out the land liberation vision put forth by Robert
Odawi Porter. Part II compares the land liberation vision to Amartya Sen‘s newest contribution
on political justice theory, The Idea of Justice. Part III examines land liberation in more detail—
its implications and possibilities—focusing on the ―plenary power problem,‖ and ―loss of trust
problem.‖ Part IV finally concludes by identifying new opportunities to realize the land
liberation vision in an Obama era.

17

This article does not intend to assign value to either theory as each theory fits its unique context and purposes.
Few commentators, however, have given credit to first peoples‘ contributions to international legal and social
theory. See S. James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International Human
Rights Law, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL‘Y 107 (2006) (arguing that indigenous peoples have taken advantage of, and
contributed toward, the fast-paced development of international human rights law).
18

Amartya Sen offers an interesting perspective about the inter-relatedness between norms and law. See AMARTYA
SEN, Normative Evaluation and Legal Analogue in NORMS AND THE LAW 250 – 251(John N. Drobak ed. Cambridge
Press 2006)(contending that normative moral rights and duties are understood by their legal analogues and that as
such, law and law-making inform moral norms as much as norms inform law). If law not only reflects norms but
influences them, then the political goal of this article is, in part, to inspire legal re-imagination as a vehicle for social
change for American Indian emancipation.

5

I.

Land Liberation Vision
Over the last year, Indian law scholar, Robert Odawi Porter, has called for the Obama

administration to assist tribes in achieving land liberation.19 Land liberation, in his view, is the
federal government‘s return of trust land to tribal sovereigns.20 His argument relies on a
compelling rationale that the absence of tribal ownership over land inherently limits tribal
sovereignty and in many instances, prevents tribes from achieving economic self-sufficiency.21
Porter believes that Indian control over vital land resources will emancipate tribes from their
dependent-nation status from the federal government.22
I should preface this Article with the acknowledgment that Professor Porter has not
directly written on his land liberation proposal, though, I believe that much of the land liberation
vision is embodied in his work about tribal sovereignty. This Article is my iteration of his vision,
notably from a non-Indian perspective, and it is one that skims the surface of many details and
implications of a tangible proposal. My hope is that this Article may invite Indian advocates and
scholars to join leftist Indian voices in exploring this vision and proposal during a time of
potential socio-political transformation across the world.
19

Beyond Land-into-Trust: Creative Land Ownership Options for Tribes, DC Indian Law Conference, and
November 13, 2009 (proposing the theoretical idea of land liberation as an available opportunity for further
investigation during the Obama administration).
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

The dependent-sovereign or diminished sovereignty doctrine is one of the three foundational Indian law principles
originating from the Marshall Trilogy. See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (designating
tribes, which reside within U.S. territorial boundaries but exist as independent sovereign nations, as ―domestic
dependent nations‖ under Congress‘ plenary power). The other two doctrines include the plenary power doctrine and
trust doctrine. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (declaring the discovery doctrine application
to tribes); Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (establishing an implicit trust relationship
between the U.S. federal government and tribes). See also Robert O. Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. R. 1595, 1597-1598 (2004)(criticizing American Indian legal scholars and practitioners
for analyzing foundational doctrines but failing to examine the broader context of American Indian jurisprudence as
―the law of the colonizing nation‖).
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I believe that Porter‘s land liberation vision is a remarkable suggestion that warrants
serious consideration. Such a vision poses a set of ethical questions and another set of legal
questions. I intend to briefly address each set of questions in this article. Porter‘s moral vision is
persuasive because it draws from his and other Indian law scholars‘ work which argues for
genuine tribal sovereignty and recompense for harm suffered.23 These arguments are
independently strong, but I hope to offer insights from a comparative examination of Western
philosophical thought, American Indian jurisprudence, and intuitive thinking about United
States-American Indian justice. The values and goals underlying these theories are similar and
inform how we should concretize these visions moving forward.
From such a vantage point, it is easy to see why a strong supporter of tribal sovereignty,
like Robert Porter, is attracted to an idea like land liberation. Land restoration, which is the
return of tribal land title from federal government trust, would allow tribes to independently
execute their own land-related laws24 and policies that open opportunities for a range of
sovereign powers, including renewable energy production and gaming development.25 The

23

Some of the most prominent law scholars‘ voices for American Indian emancipation from federal government
supremacy, reparations, and entitlements in addition to Robert Odawi Porter, are Robert Williams Jr., Ward
Churchill, and William Bradford. William Bradford, in particular, has written extensively on U.S.-American Indian
reconciliation. See generally Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO STATE L.J. 1
(2005) (assessing a range of justice models to administer tribal relief which include reparations, restitution, public
apologies, and policy reform); The HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE
STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2008) (emphasizing
the importance of sovereignty in dictating tribes‘ economic capacities and futures).
24

See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (arguing for indigenous right for self-determination to avoid genocidal costs resulting
from nations‘ climate change adaptation strategies).
25

See Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENTL. L. 1143, 1152-1153 (2009) (stating that
while American Indian advocates see opportunities for renewable energy development, tribes usually lack start-up
capital for projects, which, therefore, requires private investment; this option, however, is hindered by heavy federal
regulation over tribal development that requires federal approval.). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing
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provocative idea of land liberation offers, at least principally, some pathway through which tribal
governments can better address ever-changing tribal conditions, particularly for those who view
American Indian law foundational principles as perhaps primarily designed to maintain nonIndian control over Indians.26
It is, nonetheless, land liberation‘s legal questions that are less clearly understood. Land
liberation, quite frankly, undermines a large portion of American Indian law, which could be a
positive turn of events.27 It also creates a vast world of uncertainty which may negatively affect
tribes at least in the short-term. Land restoration alone, however, cannot guarantee land liberation
for two reasons.

Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39, 41-42 (2007)(arguing that the over-reaching federal
regulatory scheme on Indian gaming severely disadvantage tribes by mandating state revenue-sharing and by
weakening their bargaining power in compact negotiations); Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your
Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. R. 245, 268-278
(2005) (explaining how land alienation restrictions placed on individual and tribal reservation land prevents
possibilities for long-term wealth development); Robert Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique
Challenges, Unlimited Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1297 (2008) (surveying the complex matrix of bureaucratic
challenges that deter Indian entrepreneurship despite its promise to lift many Indians from poverty). But see also
Wambdi A. WasteWin, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in spite of U.S. Trade
Restraints—Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383
(acknowledging tribal market sophistication and resilience in traditional trade and commerce).
26

See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990)(introducing a critical race analysis to American Indian law and history in a description of the role
of imperialism and power in American jurisprudence toward Indians); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. R. 21, 22 (2005)(claiming that the Court altogether foreclosed
the option of tribal land restoration, at the time, when it established the ―doctrine of discovery‖ in Johnson v.
McIntosh); William Bradford, “Another Such Victory And We Are Undone”: A Call to American Indian Declaration
of Independence, 40 TULSA L. R. 71, 72 (2004)(arguing that Indians have been ―saddled‖ with the EuropeanAmerican problem which is a political and legal system created with the sole purpose of preserving the ―might of the
conqueror‖); Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United
States, 28 GA. L. R. 453, 458-467 (1993-1994)(recounting various methods by which the U.S. federal government
exercised or facilitated American Indian land dispossession through fraud, threats, and policy coercion); Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations,132 UNIV. OF PENN. L. R. 195, 196
(explaining that the judiciary have ―labored‖ to clarify federal control over Indians, yet when tribal sovereignty is
considered, the U.S. Constitution provides no guidance other than federal control).
27

See Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, United States Government Printing Office, 91 (1945)
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/cohen/5cohen89.pdf (asserting that federal government power over Indian tribes or
tribal members is as far-reaching as its power of citizens that it is essentially ―plenary‖).
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First, there is the ―plenary power‖ problem. Even if title is transferred from one sovereign
to another, the federal government reserves almost unfettered, constitutionally-based, plenary
power over tribes.28 For tribes to enjoy genuine land liberation they must be afforded full
freedom to make land use decisions, free of U.S. meddling that may effectively nullify or amend
tribal decisions.29
Second, land restoration creates a ―loss of trust‖ problem, which may undermine tribal
sovereignty or threaten tribal well-being. Some tribes, especially smaller ones or ones with fewer
resources, may not possess the political will to abandon the federal trust model, preferring
instead precarious trusteeship over potential loss of federal funding and programs.30 Although
relinquishing land trusteeship does not necessarily eliminate the federal government trust
relationship with tribes in its entirety, such a shift may fundamentally change or eviscerate the
modern fiduciary-trust doctrine.31

28

See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 515 (holding that state jurisdiction is repugnant to United States‘
Constitution, treaties, and federal laws); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that the federal
Major Crimes Act was applicable to tribes despite tribal sovereignty due to constitutional plenary power); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding federal allotment policy on congressional plenary power
grounds).
29

See Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America,
34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2000) (observing that in the historically-tied relationship between land rights and tribal
sovereignty that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that divests tribal government authority to regulate trust land,
ultimately weakens tribal sovereignty).
30

See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Government and the
Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 349-340 (2005-2006) (acknowledging that tribes may fear tipping the
balance of a delicate trust-sovereignty scale because meaningful sovereignty presents uncertainty around tribal
governmental capacity).
31

The modern trust doctrine defines the federal government‘s fiduciary trust relationship with Indian tribes or tribal
members as opposed to the original doctrine which relied on treaties and agreements. The fundamental ―guardianward‖ rationale, however, remains intact. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (holding that statutes
and regulations established fiduciary federal government trust responsibility to manage property for Indians); Cobell
v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (2001) (holding that a fiduciary relationship exists when the federal government takes
elaborate control over tribal monies or properties even without express statutory authorization).

9

Many tribes also may face the real threat of state encroachment without federal trust
―guardianship.‖ States, from one perspective, are likely to exercise improper legal power over
tribal land to lay claim over natural resources.32 Still, others may argue that illegitimate state
encroachment is a favorable risk compared to legally-sanctioned federal encroachment on tribal
resources, government, and people. Conceptually speaking, the loss of trust problem poses hard
questions about desirability, risk, and fairness, which must be thought-through in the land
liberation vision.
I should stress that land restoration is not a new idea, academic idea or legal idea. It is
embodied in the American Indian liberation struggle itself.33 It is embodied from the mournful
Cherokee Trial of Tears to Lakota Indian Wounded Knee Massacre. It takes on a new meaning,
however, in an anti-colonial, human-rights era. Because land liberation and human rights visions
look in the same justice-oriented direction, it is valuable to explore their connections and assess
their applications to the protracted United States-American Indian land conflict.

32

The federal government enjoys plenary power over Indians affairs, however, states may exercise jurisdiction
under limited circumstances when state interests are arguably involved. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)
(holding that state regulation applies to non-Indians who allegedly commit an on-reservation crime). However,
states may over-reach its legitimate jurisdiction when lucrative resources or enterprise is at stake. See generally
Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S. D. L. R. 48
(2010) (arguing that the era of ―self-determination‖ for Indian tribes is diminished against recent federal and state
encroachment on tribal sovereignty); see also Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from
States in Gaming Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development: Satisfying the “Economic Benefits” Test, 54
S. D. L. R. 421-422 (2009) (explaining that a considerable non-Indian constituency challenge tribal claims over
gaming revenues in legislatures and courts even though tribes maintain stronger claims and possess a greater
economic development need).
33

See Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 137, 318 (recognizing that
indigenous peoples in the Americas have employed a variety of advocacy strategies to defend their interests,
including warfare, diplomacy, litigation, lobbying, and tribal disobedience). Some advocates have moved toward a
self-defined conception of sovereignty to re-center Indian extra-legal experiences for liberation. See Wallace Coffey
& Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of
Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 191, 197 (urging for Indian law scholars and advocates to re-define
sovereignty to integrate an internal sovereignty notion—cultural sovereignty—into popular sovereignty conceptions
to more deeply locate land and home analogies that are central to Indian survival).
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II.

New Meanings of Freedom, Rights, & Justice

A New Idea of Justice
Amartya Sen‘s recent work, The Idea of Justice, both contributes to, and departs from,
John Rawl‘s seminal 1971 work, A Theory of Justice.34 A Theory of Justice, regarded today as
among the most important political philosophy models of the twenty-first century, laid out
Rawls‘ foundational equality principles for institutionally-based societies to achieve justice.
Rawls‘ theory imagined a scenario in which free and rational persons would agree to accept
equality as a term of association and facilitate consensus-building on two conditions. 35 The first
condition is ―justice as fairness,‖36 which is the social ideal to be reached within the Rawlsian
imagination. The second condition is called the ―original position,‖ where all persons involved in
the agreement process are stripped of vested interests under a ―veil of ignorance.‖37 Once these
two conditions are established, a set of persons known as ―legislators‖ enter agreement stages to
reach consensus on other regulatory principles and institutions. Thus, consented-upon principles
emerging from this set of agreements are adopted by society and culminate into a more equal
society. Rawls distinct vision certainly revitalized the topic of justice among political
philosophers, and slowly shifted the imaginative paradigm on justice over the last forty years.
The Idea of Justice, in contrast, is the accumulation of Sen‘s critiques of A Theory of
Justice over several decades. Sen describes Rawls‘ ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine as ―deeply

34

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press, Harvard University Press 1999) (1971).

35

Id. at 10.

36

Rawls emphasizes that his conception of justice centers on rational fairness and its relation to social life, otherwise
known as ―social justice.‖ Equality, liberty, and their social relations constitute the essence of the ―justice as
fairness‖ principle. See id. at 6-10.
37

Id.

11

relevant‖ to modern justice theories, including his own.38 Yet he criticizes Rawls‘ other main
premises as being ―seriously defective.‖39 The Idea of Justice attempts to improve upon Rawls‘
theory with a strong emphasis on the delivery of equality to persons in a just society. The most
relevant contribution from Sen, within an American Indian law context, is his sharp departure
from a transcendentalist or institution-driven approach.40 His vision has a unique emphasis on
human capabilities. This person-centered vision, which has the potential to be invoked by the
land liberation vision, supplants the political motivations behind full tribal sovereignty
restoration.41
Sen‘s theory builds on Rawls‘ ―justice as fairness‖ principle, and, at the same time,
responds to its shortcomings. The ―justice as fairness‖ principle, in Sen‘s view, can be reduced to
the societal value of impartiality—free from bias, interests, and prejudices—in the evaluation of
primary goods distribution.42 Rawls‘ impartiality, within the original position, is achieved under
a ―veil of ignorance,‖ which identically (dis)advantages choice-makers who are detached from

38

IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 54.

39

Id. at 53. See also AGAINST INJUSTICE: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF AMARTYA SEN 47 (Reiko Gotoh & Paul
Dumouchel eds., 2009) (making a general critique about Rawls‘ theory that although it is an economic-justice
proposal, its transcendentalist roots (focus on creating a perfectly just society), in essence, contravenes an economic
analysis, which, instead, is comparatively-oriented.) Sen elaborates on this point in The Idea of Justice, yet it is a
more over-arching criticism about Rawls chosen approach that he addresses throughout his body of work.
40

Transcendentalism is defined as ―a philosophy that emphasizes the a priori conditions of knowledge and
experience or the unknowable character of ultimate reality or that emphasizes the transcendent as the fundamental
reality.‖ See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/transcendentalism (last visited May 14, 2010). Transcendentalism, in philosophical theory
of justice terms, denotes a certain set of values or goals is reached by virtue of a procedural mechanism, system, or
process.
41

See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIMES, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 32 – 52 (1987)(arguing that most philosophers agree that sovereignty is absolute,
indivisible, and unlimited, which implies that the primary challenge of tribes is to maintain its prerogatives against
time in the modern federal Indian law).
42

IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 114 - 123.
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individual benefits deriving from any particular choice. Sen‘s theory challenges two Rawlsian
assumptions: that individual liberty would emerge as the foremost principle from consensus and
that equality of resources equated to equal qualities of life. He correctly argues that these beliefs
are assumptions that require a further investigation.43
Sen concludes that Rawls‘ assumptions about liberty and equal primary goods distribution
are fatal to his theory of justice. He, instead, offers a new model, which retains the ―justice as
fairness‖ principle, yet establishes the following:
1. People‘s actual behaviors—not institutions—must serve as the bedrock for just institutions;44
2. Adam Smith‘s ―Impartial Spectator‖ (I.S.) approach better facilitates fair political choicemaking than the classic social contract approach;45
3. Universal decision-making models are more relevant today than isolated nation-state models
in an increasingly global political environment.46
The Idea of Justice consists of the ―justice as fairness‖ principle and these three
improvements from Rawls‘ theory. Sen‘s improvements rely on notions that reject classic neoliberalism, which progressive leftists believe has failed to address some of the world‘s most
pressing and enormous problems, like poverty, environmental degradation, and political
marginalization.47 An improved theory of justice model should speak to neo-liberalism‘s failures
and offer insight into how to solve endemic issues facing societies across the world today.

43

THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 65-66.

44

Id. at 67-72.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

See Noam Chomsky, Power and Globalization in the New World Order in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
GLOBALIZATION AND ANTIGLOBALIZATION 159 (Henry Veltmeyer ed., 2008) (―In old fashioned terms, this situation
would have been called ‗class war‘…Their victims should certainly resist the predictable exploitation of crisis, and
should focus their own efforts, no less relentlessly, on the primary issues that retain much as they were before:
among them, increasing militarism, destruction of the environment, and a far-reaching assault against democracy
and freedom, the core of ‗neoliberal‘ programs‖); MARCUS G. RASKIN, LIBERALISM: THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
IDEALS 186-187 (―What is clear is that the present dominant policies of the United States are dystopian…The liberal
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American Indian tribes continue to overcome many of these endemic social problems,
despite the fact that opportunities to address them are within reach.48 Worse, continual tribal
sovereignty erosion further limits tribes‘ ability to enforce their laws and govern their lands.49
The modern neo-liberal state‘s refusal to fully restore tribal sovereignty denies tribes the ability
to independently act on problems such as reservation poverty, resource preservation, and other
challenges without bureaucratic obstruction.50 Should a true tribal self-determination era actually
arrive, it is imperative to consider which new policy or jurisprudential principles will emerge.51
While some jurists may express unwillingness to abandon the guardian-ward model, a remedial
―justice as fairness‖ doctrine is a viable alternative foundation to Federal Indian law as it
hope of integrating the wretched and the working class into a world system of manageable decency, as Immanuel
Wallerstein put it, will have failed‖); Laura Macdonalad & Arne Ruckert, POST-NEOLIBERALISM IN THE AMERICAS 4
(Laura Macdonald & Arne Ruckert eds., 2009)(discussing diverging opinions about neo-liberalism‘s success but
acknowledges that the neoliberal model has become discredited in the United States and lags in expectations for the
―developing world‖ particularly in Latin America where many countries have moved toward a populist socialism).
48

About twenty-five percent of American Indians and Alaska Natives were living below the poverty level in 2004
compared to nine percent of non-Hispanic Whites. See U. S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICAN COMMUNITY—AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVES: 2004 16 (2007). Numerous opportunities exist
for tribal economic development, yet statutory impediments have slowed growth. Gavin Clarkson has written
extensively on various statutes‘ negative impact on tribes. See Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private
Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. R. 285 (2009) (criticizing existing
securities laws as starving private business growth within reservations).
49

See Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between The Constitution, The Marshall Trilogy, and United States v.
Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM, 651, 687-688 (2009) (arguing that tribes‘ jurisdiction enigma, involving tribal, state, and federal
governments, often leads to de facto lawlessness).
50

I do not mean to suggest that federal support is necessarily obstructive to tribal sovereignty. I merely want to
observe that the absence of full tribal sovereignty limits tribal freedom to execute decisions regarding their own best
interests. It is possible that tribal interests are best served with transitory reparative support. See Beyond
Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice , supra note 23, at 61 (explaining that Justice as Restoration
advocates advance rehabilitative support as a means to heal harmed tribal communities) Rehabilitative support may
morally obligate the federal government to provide dollars for tribal healing—tangible and non-tangible—for
America‘s original ―imposition.‖
51

See Pommersheim, supra note 32. Robert Porter, for example, has suggested that America‘s legal approach to
tribes has remained essentially the same so that a true self-determination era would have to radically depart from this
history. See Robert Odawi Porter, American Indians and the New Termination Era, 16 CORN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY
473, 473-474 (2007) (arguing against conventional wisdom that congressional American Indian policy is cyclical,
claiming instead that an assimiliationist agenda has driven federal government policy choices for the last 200 years).
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currently exists. The ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine presumes full tribal sovereignty recognition,
turning the inquiry from whether tribes can exercise sovereign authority to which equitable
remedies are appropriate to restore full sovereignty. In a broad sense, a ―justice as fairness‖
foundation may assist jurists and pro-sovereignty advocates in the difficult undertaking of reorienting Indian law, yet it may not be enough to propel its positive direction.52 Sen‘s Idea of
Justice may serve as an engine to drive non-Indian jurists toward American Indian land justice.
But why is this theory so important to American Indian land justice? I suggest four reasons.
First, it may be the first major development in political philosophical thinking on justice, since
John Rawls‘ theory of justice.53 Second, as mentioned earlier, it serves as a natural complement
to existing American Indian justice theories54 that advocate for co-extensive nation sovereignty.
It is a Western philosophical theory of justice analogue that, in its application, makes a parallel
case (on behalf of non-Indian allies) for Indian justice. Third, it is in tandem with, and is borne
by, international social justice struggles and trends (e.g. indigenous and human rights
movements) that are slowly penetrating American law.55 Finally, its flexibility is ideal not only
for complex, twenty-first century problems, but it is an ideal transitory model as cultural values,
52

I suggest here that a new progressive era in the United States ushered in by global-political transformation may
influence jurists thinking about the demands and justice and re-shape their thinking about Indian law‘s basic tenets
of which the ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine may be a key element in a new political environment. See also Siegfried
Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous
Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANS-NAT‘L L. 1141, 1152 - 1159 (discussing indigenous peoples‘ success in creating
political pressure for the international community to implement laws and mechanisms designed to finish the decolonization project and to assert their peoples‘ sovereign powers to establish and execute their own laws).
53

See, e.g., Carlin Romano, Amartya Sen Shakes Up Justice Theory, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept.
14, 2009 available at http://chronicle.com/article/Amartya-Sen-Shakes-Up-Justice/48332.
54

See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 23, at 69-100 (establishing a ―Justice as Indigenism‖ theory of justice that outlines
a detailed truth and reconciliatory process for the United States government and tribes).
55

See Hon. Michael Kirby, Constitutional Law and International Law: National Exceptionalism and the Democratic
Deficit?, 98 GEO. L. J. 433, 443 (explaining that while American law does not traditionally rely on international
sources interpreting its own laws, a line of recent, controversial cases have relied on international authority
including, Atkins v. Virginia, Lawrence v. Texas, and Roper v. Simmons).

15

identity politics, and legal norms evolve. The Idea of Justice and land liberation synergize
momentum away from neo-liberal dependent-sovereignty toward new-era self-determination.
The next section will examine Sen‘s critiques of Rawls‘ theory of justice and similarly, explain
how the modern neo-liberal state fails to establish American Indian land justice.
A Theory of Justice Critique
The Idea of Justice is a strong competing theory to John Rawls‘ breakthrough theory of
justice. Sen introduces three major critiques in his theory that relate to modern American Indian
law, though, he never explicitly applies his theory to Native land justice. Critical law scholars
have expressed the need for sovereignty-based principles in Indian law—ones that go beyond
politically-correct lip-service. The Idea of Justice‘s treatment of freedom, autonomy, and
fairness, illuminate how similar ideas of tribal self-determination and land liberation fit into
global demands for justice.
Sen‘s first major critique of Rawls is the assumption that just institutions necessarily
produce just conduct. In very simple terms, Sen makes a pragmatism argument, claiming that
procedural justice—the mere existence of fairly constructed institutions—cannot govern people‘s
actual behavior, particularly as human behavior is often inconsistent with collective values and
norms.56 The belief that ―just‖ institutions should rely on actual behaviors, as opposed to
theoretical behaviors, is vital because a whole system of justice requires the accommodation of a
variety of complex, socio-political and inter-personal factors.57 Sen essentially adopts a Legal
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Sen raises two objections under his ―relevance of actual behaviors‖ critique. In addition to his pragmatic
argument, he is also skeptical that social ―realizations‖ are accounted for in Rawls‘ consensus model. This argument
is a classic consequentialist objection which claims that proceduralism cannot account for unpredictable
consequences. I chose to focus on the narrower pragmatist objection because it is more closely related to the article‘s
discussion to human freedom and normative law.
57

THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 67-68.
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Realist position, in which ―the centrality of human lives in reasoned assessments of the world in
which we live‖ is paramount.58 He argues that a whole system of justice must center real
experiences as its primary object of consideration because it is analogous to building a pond
without bearing in mind its fish. Sen‘s re-orientation reflects a modern theoretical shift away
from abstract transcendental analysis to concrete, people-centered problem-solving, especially
around issues involving acute human suffering.59
A Realist perspective is valuable when examining land justice in American Indian law.
Generally speaking, Indian law jurisprudence consistently disfavors original Indian land claims,
even during the present ―self-determination period.‖60 Throughout American history, courts have
upheld unsavory treaty deals and defended malicious congressional action against tribes due, in
part, to a belief that reasonable legal formalities ensure just results.61 In broad strokes, nonIndian immoral behavior was ignored, tolerated, and sometimes extolled by courts, based on a
disingenuous presumption that ―fair‖ judicially-made legal principles would not produce unjust
outcomes or that democratically-elected governmental branches would not enact unfair laws.62
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Id. at 225.

59

Sen is an outspoken advocate against poverty because he believes that it literally and metaphysically deprives
people from experiencing the full value of freedom. See Normative Evaluation and Legal Analogue, supra note 18,
at 250 (arguing that poverty is the deprivation of the most basic human capabilities).
60

I should emphasize here that Indian law jurisprudence is not designed to collectively benefit American Indians. It
is, in actuality, related to Indian histories, in terms of the Anglo enterprise to control Indians. See. Robert A.
Williams Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian
Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. R. 981, 986-987 (1996) (arguing that Anglo law has
shaped Indian history in a way that explains today‘s legal and real context).
61

The Cherokee Nation Treaty of New Echota exemplifies coercive U.S. government treaty-making tactics. See
Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B. U. PUB. INT. L.
J. 91, 92 (2005) (recounting that Congress allowed a minority-supported, white sympathetic Nation representative to
dubiously replace the majority-supported, fervent Nation delegate during the treaty-making process, which preceded
the infamous Trail of Tears).
62

See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (illustrating an extreme ―good faith‖ trust principle
application in this landmark case that declared that the court must presume perfect congressional faith in Indian
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As Sen explains in reference to the protection of minority rights under a modern justice theory,
―there is no chance of resting the matter of ‗safe‘ hands of purely institutional virtuosity,‖ based
on the reality that empirical accounts do not justify such ambivalence.
Moreover, contemporary scholars have debunked the pretense that American Indian law
or its arbiters primarily sought to help American Indians.63 Quasi-sovereignty is an example of a
failed legal doctrine, which while originally fashioned to recognize limited tribal selfdetermination, has been judicially diminished over the years, amounting to an incredibly
bureaucratic governance structure that curtails tribal self-determination. 64 Neo-liberalism‘s
promise to expand freedoms through democracy and other open processes continues to fall short,
particularly in the American Indian context. Sen‘s critique of Rawlsian transcendentalism is
really a broader criticism of the modern liberal state‘s failure to ensure justice which American
Indian legal principles are a poignant example.
This observation about the modern liberal state reveals a much deeper point, however.
Institutional failures to actualize justice demonstrate the relevance and power of choice.
Individuals‘ choices, and social choices made within institutions, shape more than principles of
justice. These choices also shape the operation of justice. Social choice is not distilled by a pure
affairs despite any contrary, factual evidence showing that Congress exercised its plenary power against tribal
wishes to administer the federal allotment policy). See also Lincoln Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling
Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 310 (2009)(commenting that the Lone Wolf decision
altered the federal trust doctrine from an arguably protective relationship to a power-based relationship with its
implication that Congress possesses absolute plenary power to which the courts should show extremely high
deference).
63

See Robert Williams, Jr., supra note 60, at 985 (1996) (―[S]o the familiar story goes, [White Man‘s Indian Laws]
were developed here by the courts and policy-making institutions established by the dominant white Europeanderived society into a redemptive force for perpetuating American Indian tribalism‘s survival . . . is a classic
illustration of what‘s completely wrong with most Federal Indian Law scholarship‖).
64

See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON 170 – 173 (arguing that the cultural imperialist basis
upon which Indian legal principles were founded allow the Supreme Court to incrementally undermine the
―measured separatism‖ sought by tribes to exercise minimal self-determination).
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political process whether it is Rawls‘ original position or otherwise because as a contract-based
consensus may be reached on one end, individuals‘ choices will surely affect social choices
which appear on the other. Therefore, any serious critique of transcendental justice must deal
with people as choice-makers. Sen not only advocates for a theory of justice that centers people
and their experiences but he further argues that freedom is elemental to actualize justice.65
Meaningful choice, in his mind, lives in its fullness— from its scope to its quality. Social and
individual prioritization of freedom is the standard by which to evaluate the meaningfulness of
choice.
Sen‘s second major critique deals with Rawls‘ use of social contract method. In Rawls‘
theory the way to reach consensus is through mutual agreement within the original position. The
social contract method derives from the Enlightenment tradition, which analogizes the
relationship between people and government as one of a legal contract whereby persons forfeit a
degree of freedom in exchange for (limited) collective governance.66 The social contract model
contrasts against philosopher Jeremy Bentham‘s utilitarian model. The utilitarian model, instead,
reaches majoritarian agreement through a maximum utility calculation.67 Sen argues that Rawls‘
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See Amartya Sen, Justice Means Freedom, PHIL. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, Spring 1990 at 113-114 (―Given n different
types of functionings, an ‗n-tuple‘ of functionings represents the focal features of a person's living, with each of its n
components reflecting the extent of the achieve- ment of a particular functioning. A person's ‗capability‘ is
represented by the set of n-tuples of functionings from which the person can choose any one n-tuple. The ‗capability
set‘ thus stands for the actual freedom of choice a person has over alternative lives that he or she can lead.‖)
(citations omitted).
66

See Rawls, supra note 34, at 10 (explaining that his aim was to offer a theory of justice that brought social contract
theories of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant to a higher level of abstraction); CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILLIP PETTIT,
RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS 17-35 (1990) (providing more details about the origins of Rawls‘
conception of the social contract method, including specific parameters around the original position and the veil of
ignorance).
67

See P.J. KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW 69(1990)
(explaining that Bentham‘s utilitarian distributive justice framework guided legislators to act consistent with the
principle of utility and its maximization to ensure social well-being).
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theory on this aspect is under-developed because it never explored alternative consensus methods
other than utilitarianism.68 This narrow scope disabled Rawls from effusively critiquing the
contract method and its relationship to social choice.
Sen believes that there are at least four problems inherent within social contract method.
Namely, Sen criticizes its structural exclusiveness and its presumption that persons make
complete social assessments.69 Thus, in the Capability Theory, Sen replaces the social contract
method with another device—Adam Smith‘s ―Impartial Spectator.‖ 70 The Impartial Spectator
(I.S.) method suggests that a consensus model must seek perspectives that are ―‗a certain
distance from us‘‖71 to form an objective legislative inquiry. I.S. is an observatory device that
necessarily supplements the original position. Its purpose is to fill-in the closed social contract
method gaps, especially within a sovereign nation context, so that decisions may consider extraterritorial implications.72 I.S. advances the view that a watchful eye from distant stakeholders
injects a level of accountability that is presently absent from Rawls‘ chosen method, and at least
is minimally exclusive compared to other models
Sen further contends that this method, unlike the social contract, embodies a more realist
buoyancy against human irrationality (a tendency toward incomplete assessment) and avoids
arbitrary exclusion. In other words, a degree of flexibility is necessary for a practicable system of
justice to ensure fairness because people are as imperfect as their systems. I.S. particularly
68

THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 70.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 124-152 (explaining three problems with closed consensus models, including its ambivalence toward
relational justice, real implications on decisions on others, and risk for parochialism).
71

Id. at 45.

72

Id. at 124-125.
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responds to Rawls‘ critics‘ fears that rigid, elite decision-making processes result in abuse.
America‘s oppressed peoples‘ histories, including American Indian histories, warrant such fear.73
Sen envisions a more objective set of watchers who are equipped with intervention
powers. This concept is similar to Robert Williams‘ and James Anaya‘s choice of law appeals for
international law application to American Indians and other indigenous peoples.74 Sen, as a longtime human rights law advocate, supports strong accountability norms and mechanisms that do
not predominantly rely on large centralized institutions. He has advanced a three-step analysis
(recognition, agitation, and legislation)75 which aims to substantiate the notion of human rights
beyond the institutional archetype. Based on his alternative vision, the I.S. method may strike a
balance between closed, rigid decision-making processes and exclusive, concentrated
institutional control. 76
Land liberation, as a long-range vision toward American Indian justice, is a progressive
idea that contains within it the American Indian collective memory of colonial conflict,
institutional abuse, and majoritarian mistreatment, as well as cultural transmission,
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See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 33, at 202 (―American Indian history has been portrayed by
most scholars as a defensive response to European colonization (the ‗reservation period,‘ ‗removal era‘ etc ...),
leading to a rather linear appraisal of tribal sovereignty. Thus, tribal sovereignty becomes an account of what tribes
once had, how they lost that, and how they are striving to succeed living in a different world than that of their
Ancestors.) (citations omitted).
74

Robert Williams Jr., Encounters On the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of
Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L. J. 660, 663-664 (1990) (arguing that contemporary
international law provides a stage from which oppressed indigenous people can demand rights and share their
narratives as a means of their collective survival).
75

76

See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS (Fall 2004) at 315, 342-345.

This vision is very much like the existing international law model but with important changes. See James Anaya,
infra note 262.
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organizational cooperation, and political resistance.77 Tribes continue to struggle against land
divestment, despite neo-liberalism‘s worn-out promise for justice. Western democracy must
renew its commitment to justice against an oppressive historical backdrop. The Capability
Theory, consisting of a behavior-centered framework and open accountability device, improve
upon Rawls‘ arguably misplaced hope for a just neoliberal society.
The Capability Theory and Its Relationship to Land Liberation
The Capability Theory diverges from the two prominent schools of thought in political
philosophy—Bentham‘s utilitarianism and Rawls‘ transcendentalism—by attributing personal
advantage not to happiness or income but to real opportunity. 78 Thus, a just society is judged by
its distribution of freedom to persons as opposed to its allocation of wealth or pleasure.79
Meaningful freedom, in this sense, is the ability for a person to do what they value.80 This
perspective is distinct from other justice theories‘ informational foci that emphasize human
continuity (tendency to wholly define happiness in one way or to possess the same set of needs)
over human dynamism (tendency to possess pluralistic desires and hold conflicting values).81
The strength of this perspective, Sen suggests, is that its freedom cherishes a core value for the
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Writers must be careful not to suggest that all of U.S.-American Indian is negative. It is a complex history which
consists of a mostly poor record. See VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE xi (1983) (describing a complex American Indian history in which tribes were forced to retain the better
parts of old culture while adjusting to new realities posed by European overtures and intrusions).
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The IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 231.
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Id. at 228 (describing that freedom contains two distinct values, including an opportunity aspect, which involves
the freedom to pursue a particular activity notwithstanding the outcome—the quality of choice, and a process aspect,
which involves way in which we make free choices—the freedom of execution). The opportunity aspect is the most
relevant part to the land liberation analysis, however, the process aspect, which is accentuated in Rawls‘ theory of
justice, remains important, though, not as vital for the purposes of the article.
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Id. at 231-232.
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Id. at 233 (explaining that a plurality of different features affect our lives and affect our moral choices).
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quality of life rather than the mere, auxiliary means that may sustain life, such as wealth or
pleasure.82 The Capability Theory elevates a value of high moral relevance today—freedom—as
the primary assessment threshold for a just society. Better yet, it affirms human dynamism as a
core value, which also forms the foundation for the land liberation vision.
Importantly, the Capability Theory is not an individualist justice framework. It accounts
for individual existence within communities and other social phenomenon by explaining that
people‘s ability to do what they value is subject to social influence.83 Sen recognizes that it is, in
fact, impossible to detach the individual from the world within she or he lives. Capability Theory
affirms that communities play an important role in shaping people‘s totality from their values to
their beliefs about their own ability.84 Pluralism is a main principle of Capability Theory that can
be applied to the land liberation vision as well.
The Capability Theory offers a way from which to resolve the dialectic interplay between
representatives‘ (tribes and trust guardians) and individuals‘ competing interests within the land
liberation vision. American Indians are not a monolith nor are tribes perfect proxies for
individual tribe members.85 When representatives‘ and individuals‘ interests clash, tension may
be eased by a Capability Theory freedom-of-opportunity analysis, which examines the potential
limitations on actual opportunity to one interest-holder or the other. An ideal choice would
accommodate multiple stakeholders‘ freedom interests. Most significantly, a Capability
theoretical analysis opens up possibilities for fair resolutions based on actual happenings, unlike
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Id. at 233-34 (stressing that actual opportunity is freedom‘s core in a philosophical and practical sense).
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Id. at 244 (countering the methodological individualism critiques of the Capability Theory which argue that it
simply promotes free individual decision-making rather than collective justice-building).
84

Id. at 246 (emphasizing that the denial of a person‘s multiple and complex identities and memberships has the
paradoxical effect of denying persons the freedom to be themselves).

23

utilitarian or transcendental models. When applied to the land libration vision, Capability Theory
supports tribal land restoration, but may not require non-Indian forced relocation or other
seemingly unfair outcomes, either. A freedom-centered model, though intricate, more directly
leads to fair restorative justice solutions than the other prevailing models.
The Capability Theory also encompasses three other relevant values to the land liberation
vision: non-exploitation, non-discrimination, and complex need. Sen persuasively argues that
none of these values are fully secured within utilitarianism and resource-transcendentalism
because the provision of happiness or primary goods do not necessarily satisfy human desire to
be free from harm or deprivation.86 Need, in contrast, is an affirmative act, which is often deep
and multi-faceted. Justice theories for which exploitation, discrimination, and complex need are
not addressed seem to undermine the demands of twenty-first century justice.
A close analysis reveals this point. Exploitation and discrimination are values that may
co-exist with happiness and wealth. A person, for example, may feel happiness from being
significantly compensated for use of her land, but may be a victim of commercial exploitation, in
which a company may under-compensate her for the land use. Although utilitarian and
transcendentalism defenders may point out that she is happy and compensated, therefore, undercompensation is immaterial, it is indeed important because the company unfairly took advantage
of the land-owner to its benefit, and worse, should the predatory behavior continue, the
community is at-risk for further harm. Its aggregate impact implicates a broader concern that
invokes feelings about injustice.
86

Sen, supra note 18, at 327-328 (describing a comparative hypothetical involving a physically-disabled man in
which the man is not helped by utilitarian model because it would give him less money than physically fit person
and likewise, he is not helped by resource-transcendental model (Rawls‘ model) because although he would be
given more money, the institution is disinterested in his severe disability; the capability model addresses the man‘s
true needs by offering him sufficient income and accommodations for his disability, if necessary).
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Perhaps most unsettling is that the law may not be a justice-serving tool in this scenario
within an Indian law context. An actual example that is similar to the previous hypothetical is
illustrative. In United States v. Navajo Nation87 the Supreme Court held against the Nation‘s
claim that the Secretary of Interior abrogated its fiduciary trust duty in its approval of a coal
lease amendment when the Secretary delayed contractual review, and placed the Nation in a
near-impossible negotiation position with Peabody Coal Company. Navajo Nation specifically
claimed that the Secretary failed to make a timely royalty rate recommendation, in which the
delay occurred after the Secretary had an ex-parte meeting with the coal company. 88 The
majority ruled against the undue influence claim on technical grounds, arguing that ex-parte
meetings were not statutorily barred, and therefore, permissible. 89
The dissent, however, accurately isolated and portrayed the real issue—undue influence.
Once the Secretary secretly met with the coal company and misled the Nation into believing that
an adjustment decision was not imminent, the Nation was forced into a weak bargaining position.
The Nation, therefore, had little choice but to accept the lower royalty rate.90 Navajo Nation‘s
outcome underscores the reality that exploitation occurs despite legal intervention, and in this
case, legal intervention facilitated exploitation. Sadly, federal government trust abrogation is not
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537 U.S. 488 (2003).
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Id. at 512.
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Id. at 512-514.
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Id. at 520 (―The purpose and predictable effect of these actions was to induce the Tribe to take a deep discount in
the royalty rate in the face of what the Tribe feared would otherwise be prolonged revenue loss and uncertainty. The
point of this evidence is not that the Secretary violated some rule of procedure for administrative appeals, or some
statutory duty regarding royalty adjustments under the terms of the earlier lease. What these facts support is the
Tribe's claim that the Secretary defaulted on his fiduciary responsibility to withhold approval of an inadequate lease
accepted by the Tribe while under a disadvantage the Secretary himself had intentionally imposed.‖)(citations
omitted).
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uncommon,91 and as a result, tribes continue to suffer from institutional failures that primarily
benefit non-tribal members.
Equally important is that the utilitarian and resource-transcendental models do not
address complex needs other than happiness or income. Neither theory evaluates conditions
surrounding persons‘ respective needs. Instead they merely evaluate and prioritize the needs
themselves.92 Need is complex in a way that the mere possession of tangible goods is not always
satisfactory. Also, for example, when needs become urgent from long-time deprivation or abuse,
then a whole justice system must contain time-sensitive and adequate responsiveness. This is a
significant blind-spot for the prevailing models. Historically, political justice theories have
simply equated justice with basic needs being met one way or another without regard to the way
in which needs are met.93 When utilitarian and transcendental models fail to respond to critical
needs, it harms real people and demoralizes the collective pursuit for justice.94
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See generally Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing
Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2002-2003) (arguing that the Department of Justice holds an inherent
conflict of interest in challenging government trusteeship violations); Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an
Age of Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 386-387 (2003)
(explaining that trust duty conflict arises within many federal agencies which are expected to balance the ―public‖
interests with tribal interests within the context of another recent canonical case, Nevada v. Hicks); Rebecca Tsosie,
The Conflict Between the “Public Trust” and the “Indian Trust” Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native
Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003) (arguing that Indian ancestral interests are often marginalized in public trust
land considerations).
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See, e.g., Edward Sifuentes, Tribal leaders rip Census Bureau officials, NORTH COUNTY TIMES (May 9, 2010)
available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/article_1698cfa7-dadc-547e-b366-703c4f440c71.html
(reporting that San Diego County tribal leaders, the County with the largest number of federally-recognized tribes,
sent a joint letter to the Census Bureau describing a breakdown in cooperation with assigned liaisons, which could
mean the difference of millions of dollars in federal aid).
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Overall, it seems as though the Capability Theory better balances widely cherished
values—lack of deprivation (need), happiness, material security, non-exploitation and nondiscrimination. Its capacity and freedom nexus intrinsically ties each of these values together
rather than puts them in competition with one another because each value is an equal part of the
justice formula. The Capability Theory also better responds to modern state discrimination,
exploitation, and abuse, which tend to live in the gap between institutional duty and delivery.
The denial of justice in the modern neo-liberal state systemically occurs through limitations to
access or opportunity, as well as divestment, coercion, and other abuses of power. Sen‘s vision
reiterates that the imperative of a twenty-first century theory of justice is to identify and respond
to subtleties in our existing laws, administering institutions, and norm that manifest unfairness,
exclusion, and deprivation.
This vision closely aligns to one long-held by American Indian advocates for land
liberation. Part III further explores the land liberation vision with this theoretical backdrop, and
evaluates its implications and possibilities for American Indian land justice in the not-so-distant
future.

III.

Liberating Land and Life: A Closer Look at the Land Liberation Vision and Its
Implications
wakonda monshita! wakonda uidseta! witzigoe ski ikoe! winachnon minkshe.95
Land liberation is a prophetic aspiration for many American Indian people, which

conjures hope and uncertainty. It symbolizes a reunion with their cultural wholeness and a form
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GEORGE E. ―TINK‖ TINKER, AMERICAN INDIAN LIBERATION: A THEOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 17 (2008) (translated
from Osage to English as ―Grandmother! Grandfather! Sacred One Above and Sacred One Below. Thank you for
this day, for life itself, and especially for this gathering of relatives in the struggle for liberation‖).
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of spiritual renewal.96 Land restoration is the legal element for a moral realization, yet land
restoration bears little moral significance without its liberation from colonial control. Thus,
Robert Porter‘s land liberation vision is a richly powerful idea that contains layered meanings
and opportunities during the human rights revolution.
American Indian law is a significant barrier that stands between the ―current state of
things‖ and land liberation.97 Land ownership and access between Indians and non-Indians
continues to be the legal site of conflict since colonization.98 Land restoration, therefore,
implicates basic American Indian legal principles, and presents the potential to transform these
basic, though arguably very harmful principles, such as quasi-sovereignty, plenary congressional
power, and the trust doctrine. Land liberation, which is one step beyond land restoration, is a
policy proposal that builds a transitory bridge in the tribal-United States relationship from
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Id. at 9 (noting that among four major Euro-Indian cultural differences is Indian ―filial attachment‖ to particular
places which fosters cultural and spiritual values of responsibility, communitarianism, and inter-relatedness).
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See CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 55-87 (1987) (detailing that tribes retained some level of sovereignty after contact
but that this sovereignty was gradually eroded by court decisions through the twentieth century); Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 122-125 (2006) (arguing that
Congress and the Executive have adopted a reactionary approach to policy-making, which has left Indians and the
judiciary to answer pressing policy questions, however, the judiciary is usurping more and more policy-making
power that is dangerous to Indians and their sovereignty). The other primary barrier, of course, is non-Indian
political reluctance to restore original Indian title.
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See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 26, at 21 (―Indian land claims have long been a foundational and fundamental
subject of American law.‖); VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE
OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1984) (―It is important to understand the primacy of land in the Indian
psychological makeup, because, as land is alienated, all other forms of social cohesion also begin to erode, land
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Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned,
Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 487 (2005) (noting that land-less tribes find it much
more difficult to establish sovereignty).
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imperialist-imposition to sovereign co-existence.99 Land liberation, as a vision, expresses a longtime Indian demand for enduring peace, political integrity, and cultural respect.
The land liberation vision contains at least three meanings. One meaning is land
restoration—reinstating original land claims and access that many American Indian tribes and
tribal members lost. Another meaning is justice—making amends for the ways in which tribes
and tribal members lost land through unsavory land deals, federal government divestment
policies, and violent force.100 A third meaning is political emancipation101— reserving tribes and
tribal members full ability to use and govern land in a way that honors their needs and desires.102
The freedom to choose is at the heart of the land liberation vision and at the theoretical core of
tribal sovereignty.
99

See Robert Clinton, Comity and Colonialism: The Federal Courts’ Frustration of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36
ARIZ. ST. L. J. (2004) (explaining that the current American Indian law regime is designed to prevent federal-tribal
cooperation which is counter-intuitive to the reality that sovereign neighbors often have mutual interests upon which
to have a cooperative relationship).
100

See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 to
the Present (1997) (providing a general picture of colonial violence against Indians in the Americas).
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Indian affirmative action challenges have been struck down in a line of cases that affirm that Indians are properly
classified as political members of quasi-sovereign nations rather than a distinct race-based group. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference did not constitute invidious
discrimination because Indians constitute a unique political group subject to rational basis review, and that Indian
tribes as political sovereigns maintain the right to further self-government); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
645 (1977)(holding against petitioners‘ equal protection claims based on opinion that federal legislation related to
Indians is not race-based but instead it is ―legislation expressly provided for in the Constitution and supported by the
ensuing history of the Federal Government‘s relations with Indians.‖) Some scholars affirm these cases by arguing
that Indians are better described as cultural-political minorities rather than racial minorities under the existing legal
regime although there is clear indication that courts have held culturally bigoted and racist views of Indians. See
generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians As Peoples,” 39 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 169 (arguing against David Williams‘ claim that Indians enjoyed special exceptions under the law because they
are inappropriately categorized as political minorities out of reach of racial equal protection scrutiny). See also Ex
Parte Kan-gi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (holding that tribes as ―distinct
political bodies‖ retain sovereignty to enforce criminal laws onto its own citizens). But see id. at 571 (characterizing
―civilized‖ White Man‘s laws as demonstrative of racial superiority). See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial
Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004) (arguing that American
Indian tribes should be seen as racial, cultural and political minorities who exist as separate legal sovereigns).
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See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83
OR. L. REV. 1109, 1190-1199 (2004) (acknowledging that sovereignty may mean the choice to more closely align
with the United States government).
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Connecting Theoretical Principles of the Capability Theory and Land Liberation
Globalization has fundamentally changed the international political landscape.103 Politics
are no longer contained within a nation-state or within a geographical region—they spill all over
the world map. Political communities have emerged across, through, and in-between national
boundaries as justice demands from clean water to adequate housing are on the rise.104 These
political communities march under the broad human rights‘ banner and they have become a
mounting force that credits its growth to two sides of globalization, one side that facilitates
distant relationship-building and another side that creates similar political and economic
pressures against which communities struggle. 105
Economist, Amartya Sen, is a child of the human rights movement, and significantly
contributed to its development into a full-fledged political and legal revolution over the last thirty
years.106 ―Human rights‖ as we know it today, however, could not exist without the failed
European colonialist enterprise. Its remnants, along with the human rights movement‘s
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See Noam Chomsky, supra note 47.
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See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties
and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 331 (2005) (arguing that the necessity of water and
growing scarcity should establish it as a fundamental human right under international law); Padraic Kenna,
Globalization and housing rights, 15 IND. J. GLO. L. S. 397 (2008) (calling for a shift from a neo-liberal housing-asproperty regimes to a positive housing rights model).
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See GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONNECTION OF REMOTE COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL IMPACTS PROJECT, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION & MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
http://www.globalchange.msu.edu/nicaragua/overview.html (last visited May 11, 2010); NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO
(2002) (explaining the rise of corporate power and its grip on branding, identity, and original thought).
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See POLLY VIZARD, CENTRE FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROFESSOR
AMARTYA SEN IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) available at
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper91.pdf.
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ascendancy, formed the conditions for the international indigenous movement and its demand for
collective rights.107
Post-imperialism justice, whether human rights or indigenous rights, takes on a certain
resemblance from struggle to struggle in this century. Human rights-seekers and imperialist
resistors have encountered tension in their justice pursuits, yet, they have, in large part, helped
inform each other about their mutual struggles.108 This background explains the implicit
connection between Amartya Sen‘s human rights‘ justice vision and Robert Odawi Porter‘s
American Indian justice vision.109 Behind these visions is the belief that the hard, complex
realities lived by their local and world communities can be transformed—they simply need the
access and freedom to realize their own communal power and balance.
Sen‘s and Porter‘s justice visions mutually reinforce each other through four shared
values: dynamism, pluralism, flexibility, and responsiveness. These four values, missing from
modern neo-liberal justice, are engendered in the land liberation vision. Dynamism and
pluralism, for example, are exhibited by sovereign tribal nations themselves in their divergent
and evolving needs, governance, and heritages.110 Yet federal Indian law, in contrast, is
exceptionally slow to change. The conservative, United States‘ common law system,
commitment to dual federalism, and judges‘ unfamiliarity with American Indian tribes and law,
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See S. James Anaya, infra note 262 and accompanying text.
See S. James Anaya, supra note 17.
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There will be several Capability Theory elements discussed in the previously section, which I will not describe
in-depth in the land liberation section, including the Impartial Spectator method and international law comparative
analysis. This comparison will be re-visited in Part IV.
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There are 564 federally-recognized tribes and 74 state-recognized tribes as of March 2009. See National Council
of State Legislatures, ―Federal and State Recognized Tribes,‖ http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13278#state (last visited
April 26, 2010).
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instills rigidity into American Indian law that disfavors tribal self-determination.111 Accordingly,
Indian law does not facilitate responsiveness to tribal and tribal members‘ needs as much as it
facilitates Indian control. A newly-established United States and tribal nations‘ relationship must
work toward a practical kind of peace that allows tribes and tribal members to effectively
respond to their needs.
Sen‘s Idea of Justice, in turns, extracts these four important values from modern neoliberalism‘s remains. His proposed Capability Theory emphasizes the natural dynamism that
exists in our human behavior; the necessity for justice to operate within a plural environment,
among persons, and communities; the importance of flexibility to evaluate plural interests112; and
most significant, responsiveness to actual events to account for harms, such as nondiscrimination, non-exploitation, and extreme inequality.
With radical change, however, comes challenging transition. Given human rights‘
purpose to redistribute power and resources, and land liberation‘s purpose to establish full tribal
emancipation, questions emerge as to how the law will facilitate or impede progress; which
political barriers must be overcome to realize the visions; and how best to anticipate practical
111

See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The
Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court refuses to
recognize tribes as a third-sovereign because it imbalances the United States‘ firmly-held dual-sovereign system);
Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765 (stating that most of the legal community
overlooks tribal sovereigns within a federalist government context); Vine Deloria Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and
Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 203-205
(explaining that the void of knowledge about tribes, tribal histories, and specific-Indian law principles, in part, has
created a patchwork body of law, which is consistently misunderstood by courts and even each generation of Indian
law scholars who accept popular narratives as true despite evidence to the contrary).
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As discussed in the previous section, Sen argues that each person contains multiple and often conflicting
interests. See Amartya Sen, supra note 1, at 233. Some Indian advocates, in recent years, have argued that tribes, in
addition to their single tribal identities, should assume Pan-Indian identities. JOANNE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN
ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE 9 (1996) (arguing that despite
tribal diversity, many tribes have undertaken similar patterns of ―ethnic resurgence‖); DONALD L. FIXICO, THE
URBAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 123-140 (2000) (noting the rise in Pan-Indianism, analogized to kinship or
community emphases in many tribal traditions, is on the rise as increasing numbers of Indians leave their
reservations).
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challenges along the way. The Idea of Justice will guide this analysis into land liberation‘s
theoretical meaning for American Indian justice, separation, and sovereignty, regarding two
specific problems: the ―plenary power‖ problem and ―loss of trust‖ problem.
The Plenary Power Problem
The first challenge is the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power doctrine is a
judicially-created principle that grants Congress exclusive authority over Indian affairs as a
condition of post-contact ―discovery.‖113 The doctrine has evolved over time to establish a
federal government-tribe ―guardian-ward‖ relationship,114 to restore certain sovereign powers
back to tribes,115 to cede jurisdictional power to states,116 and most significantly, to allow
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See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379-380 (―The territorial governments owe all their powers to the statutes of the United
States conferring on them the powers which they exercise, and which are liable to be withdrawn, modified, or
repealed at any time by congress. What authority the state governments may have to enact criminal laws for the
Indians will be presently considered. But this power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws
for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to disposing of and making
rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the
country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national
government, and can be found nowhere else.‖); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that Congress
possessed constitutional power to lift or relax tribes‘ criminal jurisdiction per its ―plenary and exclusive‖ powers
under the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses). See also, Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope
and Limitations, supra note 26; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, supra note 97, at 163-164 (1996) (noting that although it is
known as the congressional plenary power doctrine, some scholars have argue that it in reality ―judicial plenary
power‖ reins over the United States-tribe relationship because there is so little constitutional and legislative guidance
that courts have largely dictated Indian policy as well as Indian law).
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The original trust doctrine established a guardian-ward relationship. See Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). See also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913) (expressly re-affirming the guardianward relationship by claiming that Pueblos were regarded and treated like ―other Indian communities‖ which
required ―special consideration and protection‖).
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Congress has established landmark legislation to reverse explicitly anti-Indian policies and to restore minimal
tribal sovereignty. See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461 – 79 (1970) (permitting tribes to adopt appropriate constitutions to re-gain certain sovereign
powers and granting eligibility for economic development funding). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 329 (1978) (rejecting contention that tribes derive power from the federal government but retain their powers as
independent sovereigns).
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See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribes lacked regulatory authority over state officers
investigating alleged off-reservation crimes); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribes
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over personal injury claims that occurred on highway running through
reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding
that state cigarette tax may be imposed on reservation distributors); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
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Congress to govern internal tribal affairs.117 Tribes, however, have not regained their full preconstitutional sovereignty under the doctrine‘s expansive policy scheme. The plenary power
doctrine poses a legal barrier for the land liberation vision for the reason that the United States
federal government and tribes cannot functionally reserve concurrent sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty divestment is a political vestige that can be addressed with restorative policies.
There are three frameworks from which to address the plenary power problem: full preconstitutional restoration, remedial judicial restoration, and non-judicial restoration. Each of
these frameworks may lead to a more pro-sovereignty solution than the present, yet each one
possesses varying ―ebbs‖ of sovereign Indian power. Land liberation, as a vision similar to Sen‘s
Capability Theory, strives for the highest ebb of broadly-defined tribal sovereign power. The
question then becomes this: is there a way to reach the ―highest ebb‖ through the existing legal
regime?
Full Pre-Constitutional Restoration
The first framework is full pre-constitutional restoration. Full pre-constitutional
sovereignty existed when American Indians tribes lived as independent peoples ‗by nature and
necessity‘ prior to European contact, and whereby ―tribes managed their own affairs without
outside source legitimization of their governance.‖118 Full pre-constitutional sovereignty trumps
the Marshall Trilogy so to speak, the early landmark Indian law cases that shrewdly asserted
federal sovereignty over tribes. The Marshall Trilogy authoritatively diminished full pre191 (1978) (holding that tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commits onreservation crimes).
117

See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribal sovereignty does not extend to criminal sanctions
against non-member Indians). This decision was later overturned by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4).
118

See Tweedy, supra note 49, at 654 (explaining in the Supreme Court‘s view that the establishment of the United
States legitimately divested inherent tribal sovereignty).
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constitutional sovereignty under United States federal law.119 These foundational cases
legitimized the application of Anglo-colonizer law to tribes120 and remain the source of much
scholarly discussion regarding Justice Marshall‘s political compromise and its impact on modern
American Indian law today.121 Yet there is legal consensus among Indian law scholars that these
cases limited tribes‘ inherent sovereign power in the eyes of the United States‘ federal
government.122
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See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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I undoubtedly fall into the ―critical‖ camp who views colonial power to exercise legal authority over another
sovereign as inherently suspect. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case At A Time: Judicial Minimalism
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1192-1193 (2001) (observing that there are at least three doctrinal
camps when examining the Marshall Trilogy—foundationalists, pragmatists, and critics—but noting that there is
consensus that tribes retain inherent sovereign authority). But see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993) (arguing
that Marshall‘s ―foundational approach‖ effectively balanced colonialism and constitutionalism between dual
sovereigns). See also Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing
Times, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 8, 9 (2009) (explaining that Marshall‘s foundational ―sovereignty‖ principles
represent a vacillation of contradictory quasi-sovereign policies). I agree with Kunesh‘s analysis that the correct
literal reading of the Marshall Trilogy is of one that nominally preserved pre-constitutional powers. A broad reading
is necessary to contextualize the decisions, however. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A
Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (―[D]istancing of the temporal and
moral aspects of the issue represents a social avoidance mechanism by which non-Indian American society has
marginalized questions relating to the fallout of colonization of America‘s aboriginal peoples.‖). The thrust of my
point is to the extent that the Marshall Trilogy has established foundational principles, as long as the Supreme Court
strays from those principles, and hence, from full pre-constitutional sovereignty, political emancipation grows an
ever-distant reality.
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See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N. D. L. REV. 627, 648-661 (2006)
(arguing that the Marshall Trilogy‘s importance resides not in its precedential value but in its ―origin story‖ that give
rise to major Indian law doctrines, including plenary power and the trust doctrines); Jen Camden & Kathryn E. Fort,
“Channeling Thought”: The Legacy of Legal Fictions from 1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2009)(using the
literary and critical race theory of ―legal fictions‖ to explain how false narratives within the Marshall Trilogy live on
today).
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The Marshall Trilogy cases divested tribal sovereigns of two powers: tribes‘ right to alienate land except to the
United States federal government through the doctrine of discovery (McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 543) and tribes‘
right to engage with foreign nations (Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1). A later case, Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191,
divested tribes from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-members. The reversal of the long-time inherent
sovereignty doctrine, emerging in a line of recent cases beginning with Oliphant, is known as implicit divesture. See
John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divesture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting Room Floor, 38
CONN. L. REV. 731 (2005) (observing that these cases have divested tribes of originally preserved civil and
adjudicatory powers).
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The full pre-constitutional sovereignty framework‘s goal is to re-establish co-extensive
sovereignty among the United States and tribal Nation, restoring tribes to the ―highest ebb‖ of its
sovereign power. To do so the Marshall Trilogy must be examined anew.123 Its legal and
historical impact is analogous to the infamous Dred Scott decision, 124 which upheld Black
Americans‘ diminished legal personhood until it was overturned years later by the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.125 Though the analogy is imperfect—Black Americans were
never part of independent political Nations—it is consistent with the comparison that Anglo-law
was imposed onto free persons for the purposes of legal de-humanization and control. Likewise,
as the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment signaled an outgrowth of changed political
thinking, 126 the Marshall Trilogy and its doctrinal derivatives are not sacred doctrines.127
There is an alternative view to the belief that the United States‘ founding legitimized
colonial reign. Others who have countered the Marshall rationale argue that the Constitution‘s
123

See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 579, 580 (arguing that the
Supreme Court does not hear Indian law cases to dis-entangle Indian issues but hears these cases to examine broader
constitutional issues, which suggests that Indian law is a ―vessel‖ to constitutional jurisprudence that is not centered
on establishing justice for Indians).
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See Nathan Goetting, The Marshall Trilogy and the Constitutional Dehumanization of American Indians, 65
Guild Pract. 207, 207-210 (2008) (putting the Marshall Trilogy into a ―bad law‖ context that is analogous to other
politically-driven ―compromise‖ decisions Dred Scott v. Standford, 60. U.S. 393 (1856), and Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (―All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖).
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See Goetting, supra note 124, at 207-208.

The lack of coherence is a long-acknowledged characteristic of Indian law particularly around political
sovereignty and its relationship to tribes. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political
Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 153, 154 (2008) (―Implicit in this argument is that the judiciary
would be stretching its authority and legitimacy by striking down such a vast body of law in one fell swoop. This
response is indicative of how this area of constitutional and Indian law is superficially theorized.‖) (internal citations
omitted).
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silence on tribal sovereignty should presume that the United States‘ creation did not change preconstitution sovereignty, because its architects could have expressed their intent to ―conquer‖
Indians.128 Jurists‘ unwillingness to re-visit the foundational Indian law cases is strange but
curable. For the sake of argument I will describe this philosophy as the ―Scalia solution.‖129
The Scalia solution is a case for strict constitutional construction on Indian affairs. It is
strategic for land liberation because it draws a clean line to full pre-constitutional sovereignty.
There is limited constitutional text on federal government and Indian affairs, reading that
Congress hall have the power to: ―To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.‖130 A narrow textual construction serves to create the
confines in which Congress may interact—not govern—tribal sovereigns. The approach
recognizes full pre-constitutional sovereignty, provides for a complementary, judicial reinterpretation of constitutional text without change to the text itself, and reduces Congress‘
legislative discretion from plenary power to diplomacy. Plus, it nullifies convoluted Indian
jurisprudence, neutralizes the Court‘s arbiter role as Indian policy-makers, and negates broadbased, non-Indian endorsement of Indian sovereignty as may be required through a constitutional
amendment.131 A true fundamentalist constitutional reading fulfills the land liberation vision by
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But see Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (arguing that federal government supremacy over tribes rests on ‗necessary
concomitants of nationality‘ if not affirmative constitutional powers) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)); Erin Ruble & Gerald Torres, “Perfect Good Faith,” 5 NEV. L. REV. 93 (2004) (arguing
that federal supremacy over tribes arose not from enumerated constitutional powers but from the structure of
government necessary to legitimize a new republic on the world stage).
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There is a sad irony to this moniker. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361 (dismissing full tribal sovereignty as a view held
by Justice Marshall that was ―long ago‖ in his majority opinion which held that tribes did not have civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over a state official whose alleged misconduct occurred on-reservation despite often traditionalist views
on textual construction and stare decisis).
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Indian Commerce Clause, art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., fn. 4, 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938) is credited with fortifying
politically unpopular minorities from majoritarian assault. American Indians, however, for a number of reasons, are
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restoring full Indian sovereignty and by providing a pragmatic rationale on which to base this
vision.
Critics will immediately question the likelihood of a judicial U-turn. While I am under no
illusion that the Court would not radically change American Indian jurisprudence absent any
changes in composition or political climate, change is inevitable. The real question becomes in
which direction change will head, and how it will head that way. A coalition of new Indianfriendly judges and old strict constructionist judges may make for a more viable likelihood given
the right case.132 Plus, political pressure can play an influential role. Although electoral politics
should not prescribe sovereignty, political environments undoubtedly affect shape
jurisprudence.133 As political attitudes change and increasing political pressure is applied, a
future court may exhibit a willingness to revisit its foundational principles.
Full pre-constitutional judicial restoration is the simplest and truest way to provide for
co-extensive sovereignty among the United States and tribes. It is also the most consistent with
American Indian justice as it affirms Indians‘ plurality, preserves Indians‘ autonomy, and
upholds Indians‘ choice. Short of a remarkable event or a constitutional amendment,134 however,
there are two other options to at least gradually fulfill the land liberation vision.

not afforded the same kind of jurisprudential protection like other political minorities. The irony, of course, is that
tribes should not have to condition its sovereignty restoration on non-Indian democratic approval.
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See Fletcher, supra note 97, at 165 (observing that Justice Thomas, for example, opined in United States v. Lara
that Congress may be over-reaching its constitutional authority under the plenary power doctrine and for that reason
that the court may wish to re-visit the issue.)
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See Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court Agenda in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONIST APPROACHES 255 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (arguing that outside
political pressures play an important role as well as institutional factors to influence Justices‘ opinions).
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A number of Indian law scholars have proposed constitutional amendments. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM,
BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 307 (2009) (proposing a constitutional
amendment which emphasizes ―dignity, essential sovereignty, and durable inclusion,‖ stating ―The inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes within these United States shall not be infringed, except by powers expressly delegated
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Judicial Restoration
The second option for land liberation is judicial restoration. Judicial restoration can
assume a two-prong strategy: judicial minimalism and judicial restraint. Legal advocates can
engage in strategic, case-by-case advocacy toward land liberation to unravel harmful, recentlydeveloped Indian law policies, even if the approach relies on judicial decision-making.135
Recent judicial trends, in particular, have significantly hurt American Indians. This
option suggests that Indians will fare better with congressional policy-making over judicial
policy-making by means of judicial inaction. As detrimental as congressional policy-making has
been for Indians, the judiciary has been arguably worse. The Supreme Court, over time, has
adopted its own set of incongruous, interpretative policies to make up for Congress‘ lack of clear
Indian policy.136 Matthew L.M. Fletcher has observed although the conservative Rehnquist Court
correctly doubts congressional plenary power based on existing, narrow constitutional language
(particularly related to the Commerce Clause137) that the Court has chosen to supplement the text
with extra-constitutional, anti-Indian policies rather than adhere to strict constructionism.138 This

to the United States by the Constitution. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this Article.‖).
135

It is likely that the larger American Indian advocacy groups are pursuing this objective in some regard, though, I
am not privy to their internal strategies. This discussion is simply meant to contribute to the broader discussion on
advocacy strategy.
136

Remarks from Professor Taiawagi ―Tai‖ Helton, Current Issues in Native American Law, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
250, 251 (2002) (―While federal policy over the last few decades has shifted repeatedly, the statutes passed in any
given policy era virtually have been overruled or repealed. As a result, federal Indian law is a complex web of oftenconflicting treaties, statutes, and cases. Courts are often in the difficult position of having to review a statute based
on the enacting Congress‘s intent and policy, despite the fact that a later Congress expressly repudiated that policy
and enacted contrary legislation.‖)
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See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, supra note 97, at 164-166 (explaining that the Supreme Court took great pain,
departing from all of its other jurisprudence, to strike down Indian-commerce statutes, on the ground that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority, for the first time since the Lochner-era).
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Id.

39

trend results in gradual and unpredictable tribal sovereignty divesture that makes it difficult to
anticipate legal outcomes and to preserve tribal governmental integrity.139
Judicial minimalism is a legal philosophy that promotes democratic deliberation over
policy issues, and one which when applied to Indian tribes may serve as a longer-term strategy
for sovereignty restoration.140 Scholar Sarah Krakoff developed judicial minimalism‘s
application to Indian law, observing that the previous Court‘s ―minimalist core‖ (O‘Connor,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) often issued narrow, unitary141 holdings that sought to limits the
judiciary‘s policy influence on Indian affairs.142 Despite other political and institutional forces
that led these minimalist Justices to issue anti-tribe decisions,143 Krakoff compellingly argues
that a minimalist judicial philosophy paired with a pro-sovereignty commitment may be a viable
advocacy strategy.144
There are two tactical prongs to this strategy. The first tactic is to explicitly punt policy
decisions back to Congress as suggested by Krakoff and others. This tactic is strategic insofar
that Congress has guiding judicial norms from which to deliberate policy choices.145 Given the
Rehnquist Court‘s departure from the Indian law‘s basic tenets, including a presumption of tribal
139

See LaVelle, supra note 122.
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See Krakoff, supra note 120, at 1179; see also id. at 1182-1191.
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Krakoff uses the term unitary to describe ―shallow‖ rulings that obscure normative law underlying precedent. Id.
at 1215.
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Id. at 1178-1179.
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See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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But see id. at 1265 (distinguishing between judicial minimalism and incomplete theorization, in which the latter
is a judicial abrogation of its duty to clearly state jurisprudential underpinnings when norms attached to an issue are
―up for grabs‖).
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Id. (explaining that minimalism is beneficial only if there is the normative law underlying an issue affirms tribal
sovereignty).
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sovereignty preservation, judicial minimalism is probably only helpful in a limited set of narrow
issues.
The other tactic is consistent with common-sense understandings of minimalism which
takes the form of judicial restraint.146 Judicial restraint can neutralize the Court‘s policy-making
to mitigate further sovereignty divestment. Sovereignty restoration thus emerges from long-term
policy neutralization and eventual reversal. Urging judges to exercise restraint may be a plea on
non-existent ears but it may also appeal to specific judges‘ philosophies or case dispositions. One
fewer anti-Indian decision is not only one fewer precedential decision—it is another chance to
fight the political battle outside the courts.
Both of these judicial restoration tactics strive toward land liberation, though, in a less
sharp manner than the ―Scalia solution.‖ This option is effective from the view that it keeps a
judiciary-created problem out of non-Indian democratic control. It also reduces judicial risktaking in the sense that the Court need not uproot a body of law. Judicial restraint, with
whichever tactical approach, curbs extra-constitutional policy-making and allows the Court to
implicitly repudiate its divestment rulings on tribal adjudicatory authority,147 and civil regulatory
authority148 without as much overt politicization.149
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It is unlikely that the Roberts‘ Court sees any political cost regarding Indian cases. Should a plurality wish to
adopt minimalism, it at least insulates the Justices from ―activist judge‖ attacks. This particular Court, however, is
not shy to engage in so-called judicial activism on one hand. See STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE ROBERTS COURT 53 available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=stephen_gottlieb (―Once again the extreme
hypotheses are obviously false – everyone votes to apply or uphold Congress some of the time and not others. All of
the conservatives, however, are more than twice as activist toward Congress as the liberals, and Scalia three times as
activist toward Congress‖) (internal references omitted). On the other, it has exercised restraint around political
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Non-Judicial Restoration
Legislative restoration is another option that may inspire less skepticism than strict
constitutional construction or judicial restoration.150 This approach does not require any change
to the Marshall Trilogy or judicial philosophy. Rather, it leaves the plenary power doctrine as
settled policy. It proposes that Congress may exercise its broadly-conferred powers by legislating
full sovereignty restoration as a general act or a series of specific acts.151 Some may find this
option more attractive because it seems more feasible than a judicial sea change. Congress, after
all, unlike the Court, has more ardently supported tribal self-determination during the last thirty
years during the ―self-determination period.‖152
Affirmative congressional action may be desirable for two additional reasons:153 first,
shifting Indian policy-making back to Congress returns Indian advocates into an arena in which
they may actually win in the near future154—or at least not lose as badly, and second, it offers

sensitive issues, such as voting rights. See, e.g., Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, (June
2009) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-322.pdf (declining to rule on the
constitutionality of congressional authority to require federal election oversight over certain jurisdictions deemed to
have a history of minority voter suppression).
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See Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Souter, J. dissenting) (stating that there are only two ways that tribes can re-gain
sovereign powers—express congressional delegation or repudiation of the diminished sovereignty doctrine).
151
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Williams, Jr. eds., West Group 1998).
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sovereignty.
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and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 281 (providing an extremely powerful graph displaying favorable
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more hands-on Indian policy shaping and the opportunities for ingenuity. Its main disadvantage
is that while Congress may be willing to restore limited tribal sovereign powers, it is virtually
unwilling to wholesale cede its own power, especially without widespread non-Indian constituent
support.155 Any significant political windfall leading to a full-fledged restorative measure is a tall
order even as national American Indian organizations continue to aggressively advocate for tribal
sovereignty156 Nonetheless, the legislative reform remains an important piece of the larger land
liberation puzzle.
Robert Porter offered another suggestion. Porter recommended that advocates lobby
President Obama to use his executive authority to do Indian justice.157 He reminded advocates
that the Executive should not be an overlooked resource. A progressive administration should be
put into a position to exert some of its power. He urged policy advocates to pressure the
President to issue executive orders to restore tribes, transfer tribal land, and direct other
executive powers toward land liberation. Further, he pointed out that it was a low-risk political
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maneuver, as executive orders tend to be more discrete ways to establish administration-favored
policies.158 Most important, while acknowledging that executive power is limited to that which is
necessary to achieve political emancipation,159 presidential leadership does sets the tone for other
leaders, advocates, and players to seriously consider the land liberation vision.
The fundamental problem, however, is that under the plenary power doctrine Congress or
the President can change their minds at the stroke of a pen. Sovereignty with strings, in other
words, is really no sovereignty at all. It is difficult to accept the something-is-better-than nothing
rationale when the value of freedom is contingent on its facilitation of enabling a person to
achieve what one wishes. Given the highly-politicized nature of the American Indian legal
canon, it seems precarious to rely on the judiciary to do Indian justice. Moreover, advocates
cannot lose sight that the very vision of land liberation is that non-Indians should not dictate
Indian life or justice.160
If the American Indian liberation memory—one that invokes pre-colonial freedom—is is
real, then it cannot be realized through an ephemeral, political fiction. In the same way, if the
historical memory it is real, it cannot disappear because of outsiders‘ denials. So to the extent
that provisional sovereignty helps Indian people (as opposed to tribal elite) then it is part of the
liberation vision. The challenge is to ensure that full emancipation remains in sight. The ideal
158
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communities do not live exist in isolation. The federal government may still maintain a relationship with Indian
sovereigns, if sovereigns still choose, but this possibility is much different from the compulsory, guardian-ward
relationship.
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political and legal solution to the plenary power problem, therefore, lies in all three strategies, to
mediate imperialist histories with modern realities. Once legal liberation is achieved, the next
question—one of functional liberation—then centers our attention.
The Loss of Trust Problem
The second major land liberation hurdle is the ―loss of trust‖ problem. This problem
manifests the real consequences of an imperialist occupier‘s withdrawal161 in three ways:
strained access to essential resources, internal consensus-building, and outsider predation. Each
of these challenges is vital to address because the residual impact of withdrawal is potentially
great. The inherent risks are undeniably present but there are means that may mitigate the
severity of the transition. Liberation, in a Capability Theory context, must be viewed as the
continual means to preserve Indian homeland prosperity. In other words, freedom becomes a
continuum from which choosing the course of action is equally important to realizing a tribe‘s
capacity to freely survive. Tribes, when referring to land liberation, must be given a true
opportunity to once again exist as sovereigns, however, such an opportunity must be meaningful.
Strained Access to Essential Resources
Adequate federal government appropriations to tribes are a cornerstone to its modern
fiduciary and land trust responsibilities.162 The National Congress of American Indians‘
(―N.C.A.I.‖) fiscal year 2010 budget reported a need for billions of dollars for housing,
education, economic development, historic preservation, tribal governance and other
161

America‘s occupation in Iraq is a prime example about the risk of deterioration after external occupation and its
subsequent withdrawal. See Markus E. Bouillon, Ben Rowswell & David M. Moore, Looking Ahead: Preventing a
New Generation of Conflict in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 297 (Markus E. Bouillon, Ben
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http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/Final_Budget_Doc.pdf.
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infrastructural support.163 The tangible consequences of sudden, federal-funding stream closure
are dire when considering that Indian Country has experienced economic conditions comparable
to the Great Depression for the last 12 decades.164 Land liberation, therefore, can be seen as the
Ultimate Termination policy without careful consideration.165 Its impact—intended or not—
could be tantamount to a self-effacing starvation plan for many tribes. The United States‘ federal
government‘s trust dilemma arises from a centuries-old legacy of compulsory tribal dependency.
As the federal government has consistently abrogated its trust duty and continues to do so despite
a renewed commitment to self-determination, federal investment into Indian Country is then
necessary and obligatory as a form of reparative relief.
Tribes are entitled to United States reparative relief based on the federal government‘s
current and on-going trust abrogation as well as decades of past grievances resulting from
broken promises. Two specific promises come to mind: the government‘s general trust duty to
support tribes for their land secession166 and its fiduciary duty to serve as trustee for land and
other resources. The federal government has abrogated its general trust duty to support tribes as
reflected in budget cuts in recent years, yielding an under-funding and termination of vital Indian

163
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programs.167 Similarly, the federal government has proven to be an irresponsible fiduciary
trustee that is unable or unwilling to effectively police itself.168 For example, the Obama
Administration finally settled the well-known Cobell case,169 the longest running trust
mismanagement class action lawsuit in U.S. history, in the breath-taking amount of 1.4 billion
dollars.170 The Secretary of Interior is accused of mismanaging oil, gas, and grazing royalties of
individual Indian beneficiaries since 1887.171 The United States‘ ability to ignore its trust
obligations, and yet, maintain substantial control172 over tribes and tribal affairs is unmerited and
inequitable at best. Indian reparations, therefore, should compensate tribes for previous funding
shortfalls and continued programmatic funding deficit.173
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Reparations are also due for past destructive policies which have impaired tribal
existence174 and economic growth. N.C.A.I. has recently requested funds for ―land
consolidation‖ in the meager amount of 145 million dollars over six years.175 Land consolidation
is intended to correct the disastrous late nineteenth century allotment policy176 administered from
1871-1928 which fragmented 130,000 land tracts among 4 million ownership interests.177 Tribes
are precluded from productive land use without owner permission; consequently, purchasing
land rights is imperative for the future reservation infrastructural economy.178
Finally, reparative relief is due to concretize the federal government‘s official apology to
American Indians issued in late 2009.179 President Obama signed the ―Native American Apology
Resolution‖ in December, which is, on one hand, a tremendous symbolic victory for tribes. On
the other hand, the apology was discretely rolled into a defense spending bill to which the
administration drew no attention.180 The resolution included a disclaimer stating that it should
174
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not be construed as supportive of any legal claims against the United States government.181
Reparative relief offers an earnestness that is absent in the administration‘s disposition thus far.
It is far from hush-money, as some may say. Paired with land liberation or steps toward it,
reparations signal a true tide toward tribal self-determination.
Reparations can also take several forms—monetary restitution, land restoration, and
rehabilitative relief, for example. Each reparation form is appropriate for a particular claim class.
Reparations, in other words, is neither a ―one-size-fits-all‖ curative step nor the only step within
land liberation. Indeed, the provision of diverse reparative relief is critical step toward land
liberation because it meets the multitude of existing needs among tribes and tribal members.
Monetary restitution is appropriate for treaty breach damages and interest.182 Tribal land
dispossession largely took place through formal mechanisms such as treaties rather than through
brute force.183 Scholar Nell Jessup Newton qualifies that although some treaties resulted from
―arm‘s length negotiations‖ that the majority were executed through fraud, duress and under
other dubious conditions.184 While some tribes have brought successful contractual claims to
federal courts, many more cases have been unsuccessful. 185 Moreover, individual claims do not
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reflect the aggregate material and emotional harm from treaty breaches or wrongful treaty
agreements that resulted in widespread displacement and death.186
Land restoration, for similar reasons, is appropriate to provide equitable remedy for treaty
breaches and congressional policies that facilitated land takings. There are, of course, many
practicalities that emerge from restoring tribal title in large areas of land but feasibility does not
necessarily detract from the legal entitlement, and certainly from the political-moral
entitlement.187 It was attempted before through the Indian Claims Commission but due to
numerous factors, including the Commission‘s limited tenure and remedial power, it did not
effectuate its potential to achieve land liberation.188
Lastly, rehabilitative relief is necessary for tribal stabilization.189 Tribes may benefit from
in-kind resources that will enable tribes to restore customary (or other) legal systems,
commercial infrastructure, and environmental preservation efforts, in addition to monetary
restitution and land restoration.190 The United States may offer expertise, experience, and other
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technical knowledge desired by some tribes, which should be made available due to the federal
government‘s role in dismantling once functional tribal systems.191 Rehabilitative relief may
alleviate many tribal governments‘ pressures to generate income in a way unlike the other two
reparative forms.
The material ―loss of trust‖ problem must be put into perspective. The United States has
never satisfactorily fulfilled its trust responsibility and is least likely to do so during recessionary
times.192 The federal government continues to nominally support tribal sovereignty and at the
same time, continues to undermine tribal sovereignty under its legal and bureaucratic systems.
This contradictory position, defined by forced tribal dependency, correlates with the United
States‘ political solemnity about tribal sovereignty. Once the United States becomes serious
about tribal sovereignty it can ensure a careful and adequate tribal transition to full sovereign
nationhood, primarily through material means. While tribal sovereignty—tribes‘ status as a free
and independent nations—is not contingent on United States‘ willingness to fulfill its political,
legal, and moral obligations, tribes are no less entitled to it, and they should no less demand it, as
a matter of justice.
The material ―loss of trust‘ problem will ultimately depend on each tribe‘s economic
circumstances and leadership if the United States fails to take the momentous step toward
reparative relief. Given that the United States continues to cut tribes‘ funding, however, seeking
full sovereignty may be more of a political calculation of risk than a mathematical calculation of
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dollars. The political calculus may add up for some tribal leaders—current (dire) economic
conditions plus potential revenue-generation with sovereignty status may be greater than a future
of steady federal cutbacks and limited revenue-generation as quasi-sovereigns. Political risk will
reach a different outcome for others, particularly if economic opportunity and federal
cooperation have proven to be a lucrative match.193 The key point from this section‘s discussion
is that tribes should be able to choose their economic destinies, especially if either outcome leads
to scarcity and deprivation. At least full sovereignty, for many tribes, will offer a brighter, freer
future.
Internal Consensus-Building
The internal consensus-building issue is mostly one of procedural justice. There are
inherent ontological tensions between self-determination and the pursuit of independent
sovereign status. How can a single sovereign or a collection of sovereigns determine for another
sovereign that it must establish its independence to fully enjoy its political and legal sovereignty?
Or alternatively, how can a single sovereign or collection of sovereigns preclude another
sovereign from its independence? Quite simply, neither scenario should be possible but it is the
former question that is of most significance to the ―loss of trust‖ problem. This tension between
self-determination and status is among the biggest challenges for the land liberation vision: how
to provide the option of full, independent sovereignty without imposing it onto tribes?
Importantly, tribes must possess the political-will to pursue political emancipation.
Emancipation cannot legitimately be thrust onto tribes because the United States determines it
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should be so. Such an outcome directly contradicts self-determination at its core. Nor can the
United States federal government decide which internal consensus process tribes ought to use. It
has made this mistake before and it yielded bad results.194 Scholar, Rob Dickinson, describes the
conceptual meaning of self-determination from a legal perspective:

Secession is the ultimate potential result of self-determination, although not the
only one, and may be defined as ‗the separation of part of the territory of a State
carried out by the resident population with the aim of creating a new independent
State or acceding to another existing State.‘ While secession is just one of the
panoply of outcomes that may pertain under the concept of self-determination, it
is the one with the most far-reaching consequences, although secession is not of
itself a right of self-determination. External self-determination through secession
may be contrasted with internal self-determination, which may be seen as a
protection of the right ‗of national or ethnic groups within the state to assert some
degree of ‗autonomy‘ over their affairs, without giving them the right to
secede.‘ Internal self-determination can therefore be understood as ‗forms of selfgovernment and separateness within a state rather than separation (so-called
‗external‘ self-determination) from the state.‘195
The layered meanings of self-determination are also sufficiently inter-related that it is
difficult to untangle its practical meaning. An external self-determinative right to secede
implicates the internal self-determinative right to decide whether to secede and how to do so, for
example. A rational evaluation does not offer much guidance.196
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International law does not smooth this tension either, especially regarding indigenous
peoples‘ rights.197 The International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 states that a
people‘s right to self-determination excludes secession.198 Further, the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples‘ Article 3 declares that that indigenous people reserve the right to
―freely determine their political status,‖ yet Article 46 explains that nothing in the declaration
should be viewed as an authorization or endorsement of action against the territorial unity of
states.199
Interestingly, American Indians may be a unique position under international law for two
reasons. First, American Indians have always been viewed at least nominally as political
sovereigns, not ethnic minorities,200 therefore, if tribes succeed in land restoration—in a legal
sense—then territorial unity is not threatened. Second, this provision should be read against a
backdrop of the United Nation‘s goal to avoid ―breaches of peace.‖201 The likelihood of
widespread physical violence seems low. Even the United States will not engage in a violent
onslaught against tribes that opt for a changed political status for the entire world to see in the
age of digitized media. It seems, at the very least, that American Indian tribes may be able to use
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the Declaration as a guiding source for legitimization in its emancipation pursuit even if its selfdetermination definitions remain murky. Advocates must keep in mind, as well, that all
international law instruments are by-products of political comprise, which are subject to change
as political winds change.
Nonetheless, land liberation should encompass a classical self-determination definition
without legal qualification. In this spirit, tribes should enjoy multiple pathways by which they
can choose to assert their sovereignty. The Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010202 is an
interesting model. It provides for a two-part plebiscite203 (the first on whether Puerto Rico should
seek out a different political status and the second listing four political statuses from which
voters should choose).204 American Indian tribes, unlike Puerto Rico, vary in customary and
modern governance so that a majority voting system may not be appropriate for all tribes.205
Instead, the bill is a reminder that there are a variety of sovereign statuses from which to choose.
The Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010 lays out four status options in the second
plebiscite: independence, sovereignty in association with the United States, statehood, and
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commonwealth.206 As with the full sovereignty discussion earlier, each status assumes various
sovereignty ―ebbs‖ along a continuum, from independence being the ―highest ebb‖ to
commonwealth (its present status) being the ―lowest ebb.‖ Commonwealth status is the most
questionable under international law,207 which is very similar to tribal quasi-sovereignty. It vests
substantial self-governance powers to Puerto Rico but the federal government claims to reserve
plenary power over Puerto Rico.208 Unlike tribes, however, the federal government elects not to
exercises its legal right as a matter of ―legislative grace,‖ although the United States retains its
power.209 Based on this imprecision, some view Puerto Rico‘s political status as more akin to a
colonial than a sovereign entity,210 and thus, argue that Puerto Rico ought to seek a different
sovereign status, including full independence.211
Sovereignty with association is perhaps the most curious and least well-known choice
among the options. It is perceived as an intermediate status between statehood (integration into
the United States) and independence.212 Sovereign powers are divided between an associate body
and a principal body (United States) and the associate body drafting and implementing its own
constitution without external interference.213 While this may be a viable option for Puerto Rico, it
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may not appeal to some tribes which experienced the Indian Reorganization Act (―I.R.A.‖). This
political status seems precariously close to it, though without constitutional template, because the
theoretical absence of external interference, considering American Indian history, may not
actually bear out in reality.214 Other tribes, on the other hand, may be drawn to this choice
because it is the closest status that preserves self-determination short of full political
emancipation. Ultimately, tribes should elect to choose their political status, among these choices
and all others as consistent with international law, in the matter in which they choose.
The political will ―loss of trust‖ problem is a complex one, from a legal perspective,
particularly if it were pursued without the United States‘ consent. Should the United States
consent or tribes exercise civil disobedience,215 the tough theoretical question becomes how can
all parties proceed while preserving tribal self-determination? The central value implicit in this
analysis is choice. There are a plethora of reasons why tribes may choose to remain as quasisovereigns or seek a different status whether it is sovereignty with association, independence, or
something else.216 Tribes ought to reserve a choice in status and a choice in how to achieve
internal consensus regarding the status issue. There may be concerns about elite or majoritarian
control but it is no more a concern than it is with any other sovereign. This does not mean that I
dismiss these claims but it means that they are not any more exceptional, and therefore, should
not alone preclude addressing the political status question. Internal consensus should remain
fundamentally internal with as little external interference as possible.
Outsider Predation
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Another ―loss of trust‖ concern is outsider predation. ―New‖ nation-states, particularly
ones experiencing transition from secession, often exhibit political and economic vulnerability,
ripe for internal or external exploitation.217 External exploitation, by one nation-state or another,
is the subject of intense ethical and political concern in international law. Encroachment by states
and individual non-Indians over emancipated tribes is a serious concern in this context, and it is
an issue that warrants critical examination.
State encroachment over tribes is a specific and unique concern that arises based on
tribes‘ historical relationship with states.218 The historical tribal-state relationship derives from
an early federal protectionist policy articulated in Worcester v. State of Georgia.219 Justice
Marshall declared federal plenary power over Indian affairs to avoid a thorny patchwork of state
dealings with Indians during the early treaty-making years and to assert federal supremacy over
states during the Supreme Court‘s infancy.220 The Worcester decision attempted to insulate the
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Indian Commerce Clause against Georgia‘s challenge, which was established to correct an
Articles of Confederation defect that failed to prohibit state interference with tribes, by declaring
federal pre-emption over Indian affairs.221 Subsequent cases re-affirmed what one scholar calls
the ―deadliest enemies‖ model222 of tribal-state relations.223 This adversarial relationship between
states and tribes is the traditional perspective once embraced by courts, Congress, and legal
scholars.
More recent examples of tribal-state collaboration, however, are complicating this
historical picture. Some tribes and states have embarked on joint initiatives to solve common
problems, such as cross-deputization of law enforcement officers, and specialized, concurrent
jurisdiction courts for domestic violence and substantive abuse.224 Similarly, some tribes and
states have cooperated well under the Indian Child Welfare Act (―I.C.W.A‖) with the
implementation of indigenous-based practices to settle tribal-state child welfare disputes.225 In

proudest mounment [sic] of human wisdom and patriotism, it would be the frail memorial of the ignorance and
mental imbecility of its framers‖).
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some instances, tribes and states are initiating ways in which they can better serve their mutuallyaffect citizens, while in other instances, tribes and states seek to improve compulsory
relationships springing from comprehensive, federal Indian legislation, like I.C.W.A.
The most notable example of tribal-state collaboration, however, is Indian gaming,226
which was ushered in by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (―I.G.R.A.‖)227 enacted in 1988. The
twenty-six billion industry228 brought jobs and much-needed revenue to many tribes, providing
funding for schools and other social service programs suffering from federal cuts.229 Over 200
tribes operated 350 gaming establishments in thirty-states in 2005.230 It is undoubtedly ―big
business‖ that some scholars believe presents an opportunity for full tribal sovereignty.231
Indian gaming has at least nuanced the today‘s tribal-state relations. Tribal-state
cooperation, after all, is an appealing choice during a period when non-federal jurisdictions face
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similar limitations from budget deficits.232 Experts, Andrew Light and Kathryn Rand argue that
the Indian gaming phenomenon represents a series of compromises—some bore out of mutual
agreement between tribes and states and many more through federal and state imposition.233
Tribal-state relations are no longer arms-length, adversarial relationships as much as they are
perhaps close rivalries.
Some others argue, however, that Indian gaming is a new phenomenon that it has simply
re-vitalized an old concept: tribal-state compacts and collaborative agreements.234 Gaming
revenue-sharing compacts arguably represent a more positive turn in tribal-state relations from
protracted jurisdictional battles of the last hundred years that often led to tribal loss.235 Ironically,
it is I.G.R.A. that severely cripples tribal self-determination, which requires state and local
municipal revenue-sharing, yet pursuant the Supreme Court Seminole Tribe decision, failed to
authorize tribes to sue states that fail to negotiate compacts in ―good faith.‖236 As Wendell
Chino, Chairman of the Mescalero Apache, and Roger Jourdian, Chairman of the Red Lake Band
of Chippewa generally warned in 1987 before I.G.R.A.‘s passage: ―the implementation of any
gambling act would infringe upon the sovereign rights of the Indian nations.‖237
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I.G.R.A. may be regarded as a double-edged sword for tribal sovereignty, fatally sharp on
both sides. In terms of Indian gaming and tribal relationships, the federal government may be an
unnecessary ―middle man‖ detrimental to tribes despite the Congress‘ intentions to anticipate
gaming regulatory and revenue battles.238 It is also possible, on the other hand, that the federal
government‘s preemptory action was a constructive way to afford tribal economic development,
save for its statutory defect regarding state sovereign immunity. It remains unclear to exactly
assess the impact on gaming on tribes. Yet it has shown innovation is undeniably at the helm of
tribal-state relations.
The broader question is whether recent tribal-state ―success‖ stories translate into the
silencing of state encroachment fears for all or even most tribes? The answer to this question is
probably not. States may no longer be tribes ―deadliest enemies‖ but many states are cooperative
only insofar that they exercise power over tribes.239 Forced tribal dependency through I.G.R.A.
compels tribal leaders to make another set of difficult, unpredictable choices: to venture in
gaming to raise desperately needed revenue to cure devastating poverty in exchange for
sovereignty; to march down the road to sovereignty for the purposes of making short-term
compromises; or to refuse the potential pot of gold entirely.240 I.G.R.A., in its present form, is
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not the model for tribal-state relations. State encroachment remains a persistent problem in light
of state abuse of tribes and political disenfranchisement resulting from the industrialization of
Indian gaming.241
The rise of states‘ rights jurisprudence and political rhetoric is of particular concern for
tribes with long-term aspirations for full sovereignty restoration.242 Some conservative forces
have mounted public campaigns against gaming-enriched tribes, arguing that they are ―abusing‖
their sovereignty or gain an unfair advantage over private businesses because of their tax-exempt
status among other sovereign ―benefits.‖243 These charges are, of course, unfounded, as they are
seldom based on any knowledge about Indian law, tribal-state relations or Indian Country
conditions, yet it illustrates non-Indians‘ reluctance to embrace tribes‘ exercise of sovereign
autonomy (to the extent that it exists). States, political creatures driven by sometimes misguided
public pressure, cannot be trusted to simply leave tribes alone should they become independent
sovereigns.
(noting disparate perceptions regarding whether gaming has raised tribes to expected prosperity levels). But see
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Yet there seem to be few options for state constraint. The likely pitfall for state constraint
options is that they will resemble tribes‘ historical relationships with the federal and state
governments. If tribes are considered special sovereigns, for example, with full or limited state
relations, then state encroachment is a potential problem, especially for smaller tribes.244 If tribes
are considered more like foreign sovereigns, then the federal government must lord over tribalstate relations to reign-in non-compliant states but risk over-reaching so that relations may more
resemble its present quasi-sovereign relationship.
Perhaps any diplomatic experimentation should err toward a special sovereign model
with some sort of federal mechanism that simultaneously monitors states and restricts federal
authority over tribes and includes close international oversight for a specified duration after tribal
sovereignty is established. The final consensus on how to constrain state encroachment will
require much more attention than the short discussion in this article. Nonetheless, state
encroachment remains a very authentic and chilling reality for the land liberation vision.
Land Liberation as a Path toward a Free World
We must not become confused…There is no such thing as military power; there is
only military terrorism. There is no such thing as economic power; there is only
economic exploitation. That is all that it is. They try to program our minds and
fool us with these illusions so that we will believe that they hold the power in
their hands, but they do not…The Power….We are an extension of the Earth; we
are not separate from it. We are a part of it…The Earth is a Spirit, and we are an
extension of that Spirit. We are Spirit. We are Power. They want us to believe that
we have to believe in them and depend upon them, and we have to assume these
consumer identities, and these political identities, these religious identities, and
these racial identities. They want to separate us from our Power.245
- John Trudell of the American Indian Movement
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Indeed, the concentration on the transcendental approach has had, I would argue,
a seriously negative effect on practical discussion of justice in general and global
justice in particular. We can think of many changes that would manifestly
advance world justice as we see it, without getting us to a ‗perfectly just world.‘…
Thus, the theory of justice, as formulated in this transcendental approach, reduces
many of the most relevant questions of justice in the world as being simply
inadmissible when they would seem to be the most strongly needed. This is a pity:
when people across the world agitate to get more global justice, they are not
clamoring for some kind of ‗minimal humanitarianism.‘246
- Amartya Sen

Justice is something more than reparations, land restoration, or apologies. It is simply the
possibility of living a peaceful and free life. Colonialism—its physical, cultural spiritual, and
psychic violence—has made this possibility even harder, though not impossible, for many
American Indians. Neo-liberalism, once believed to deliver justice, has merely transformed into
neo-colonialism. It will take the firm commitment to justice, from all people, to escape this
destructive cycle. As Chippewa-American Indian activist, Winona La Duke said, ―[w]e can no
longer say, ‗it‘s too bad that those things are happening to those people, but it couldn‘t happen to
us.‘‖247 Unrealized justice is the lock of the shackles that all communities wear.
A full appreciation of justice is to understand the plenary power and ―loss of trust‖
problems. Each problem presents its own set of solvable legal and political challenges. They are
ones that bear transformative potential should the opportune conditions arrive. Opportune
conditions do not appear, however, they are made. Plenary power, advocates must remember, is
a man-made construct that can also be unmade. Advocates must remember, too, that the tribalUnited States‘ trust relationship was never real, but a shadow of a promise, that ought to be fully
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realized or not. The superficial humanitarianism myth, expressed by Amartya Sen in this
section‘s epigraph, is a dangerous fiction that should no longer placate justice-seekers. Justice is
whole and pervasive like the air we breathe, and like the metaphysical water in which the fish of
nyaya swim.
Robert Porter‘s land liberation vision, from legal and political perspectives, inspires
advocates to think critically and creatively about these challenges and their aims. This vision,
paired with Capability Theory, center four ethical values: dynamism, pluralism, flexibility, and
responsiveness. Each land liberation-inspired idea should nurture these four values in its justice
pursuit. Similarly, land liberation strategy should view each pursuit from a Realist position in
which every effort symbolizing a tool designed to dismantle the colonists‘ weapon: the
separation of people from Power. In more concrete terms, as Indian advocates fight for legal
justice, they can also re-shape the very bureaucracy created to control Indians.
This section intended to lay out a Capability-centered, theoretical discussion within a
land liberation visionary context, generally. The last section intends to further explicate several
possibilities in the human-rights and global justice contexts.
Part IV. Capability-Centered, Land Liberation Possibilities
What does all this mean for land liberation as a political strategy during a national and
global transitory era? It may mean that tribes need fuller sovereignty to better address changing
internal conditions and needs; that the United States must recognize all Native Nations, Bands,
and Collectives, as existing, self-governing entities; and that international law and the
international community must play a more effectual role in demanding indigenous justice. These
necessary changes should ultimately lead to land restoration, reparative relief, and potentially
political emancipation, to reach tribal-United States co-extensive sovereignty. There is no single
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road to take but there are several possibilities within reach. In this section, I deliberately focus on
concrete Executive and Congressional action that can facilitate land liberation. As mentioned
earlier, I argue that the appropriate role for non-Indians in the land liberation vision is serving as
allies, which translates into demanding Indian justice from the non-Indian powers-that-be
alongside Indian advocates. The following section contains several briefly-discussed ideas that
speak to this point.
What the President Can Do
President Obama can assert his power as Chief Executive to do Indian justice. There are
at least two Department of Interior directives that he can issue by executive order that are
consistent with the land liberation vision.
First, President Obama can expedite federal tribe recognition petitions. The federal tribe
recognition process is widely acknowledged as broken.248 Only eight percent of currently
recognized tribes have been approved through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (―B.I.A‖.) regulatory
process since 1960.249 Several hundred tribes are reportedly waiting on federal recognition, many
of which will be unable to meet the rigorous criterion that requires extensive historical and
anthropological data.250 The President should direct the B.I.A. to reform its regulatory rules to
facilitate the recognition process, and set a deadline by which the B.I.A. must report to the White
House of its progress before the end of the administration‘s term.
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Second, President Obama should fully fund land consolidation and the protection of land
use rights. The elimination of IIM accounts should substantially save the Office of the Special
Trustee (―O.S.T.‖) at the Department of Interior in administrative costs. The OST does not
charge administrative fees for the 131,600 IIMs that carry $15 or less, which OST claims often
costs more in maintenance than the account itself. This funding and any Department of Interior
discretionary funding should be re-directed to satisfy statutory-mandated spending for the land
consolidation and land use rights‘ protection programs. The National Conference for American
Indians reports that the Trust National Resources and Real Estate Service Programs, requiring at
least 19.2 million for water resource and rights protection, were at-risk for a one-fourth budget
cut in 2010.251 Moreover, the Rights Protection Program, which funds 49 tribes treaty and
adjudicatory rights enforcement in the Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes regions, were at-risk
for reduction to 2004 levels from approximately $22.2 million to $19.8 million, which is a 26
percent decrease.252 The President should ensure that these programs are fully funded in the
amount of at least $41.4 million.
President Obama, the ―change‖ champion, can do significant Indian justice without
risking political capital.253 It is also apparent that the Executive‘s powers are inevitably limited.
The Executive is but one of three federal branches that handles Indian affairs. Still, at the same
time, it is the most accessible for Indian advocates who have had variable success with Congress
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and courts in recent years. Perhaps President Obama‘s leadership can set a positive political tone
in the years to come.

Other Possibilities
Congress is probably the other most accessible branch to Indian advocates.254 There were
at least 65 Native bills introduced during the 111th Congress, most of which were pro-Native,
including the Native American Business Development Enhancement Act of 2009, Unrecognized
Southeast Alaska Native Communities Recognition and Compensation Act, Native Hawaiian
Government Reorganization Act of 2009, Southeast Alaska Native Land Entitlement Finalization
Act, and Job Creation Through Entrepreneurship Act of 2009.255 Most of these bills, however,
did not have many co-sponsors, and many also died in committee. There does not seem to be any
landmark Native or Indian sovereignty legislation on the congressional horizon.
Interestingly, the most important Native legislative development this year is a non-Native
bill: the previously discussed Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010. Indian advocates, on the coat
tails of this legislation‘s passage in the House, may demand a Sovereignty Taskforce to examine
the unique issues faced by non-sovereign Nations and Peoples under United States legal control,
including American Indian tribes, Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, Guam, American Samoa,

254

See, e.g., Rob Capriccioso, A legislative lesson: The making of IHCIA 2010, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 11,
2010) (stating that the reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act in March may be ―a possible
precedent for how future pieces of major Indian law may proceed in Congress‖).
255

OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS WASHINGTON BUREAU, 111th Congress Bills at a Glance, available at
http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=996&Itemid=253.

69

Midway Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Puerto Rico.256
Although a taskforce alone may not actualize many concrete changes, it can facilitate a broader
sovereignty discussion, which is essential to any congressional movement on American Indian
justice.
Lastly, one of the most important congressional legislation for land liberation is
American Indian Probate Act‘s Land Consolidation Program appropriation renewal. This
Program‘s funding is set to expire this fiscal year.257 The Consolidation Program allows tribes to
slowly re-build their land base short of an executive order or other congressional action on land
restoration.
There is always, of course, non-conventional action toward land liberation. Tribal
community leaders will continue to re-claim land258 and resist sovereignty divestment.259 I will
not speculate on these possibilities because Indian community leaders can speak for themselves,
and because, really, the possibilities are boundless. Indian liberation allies should be prepared to
support the creative range of individual, communal, and collective action that may explode over
the next decade.
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Finally, a word on international law. Renowned international indigenous rights law
scholar, S. James Anaya, convincingly argues that indigenous rights has ―gained a foothold‖
within the human rights framework, in contrast to the normative nation-state sovereignty
framework,260 by noting that some international systems have been welcoming to human rights
demands from indigenous peoples.261 Anaya advocates, despite the overture of critical voices
about the prospect of change through international law,262 a ―realist interpretative‖ approach that
supports the integration of indigenous rights into normative human rights standards, which
increasingly considers claims against the norms of overall context, the body of larger
international law, and the maximization of human rights (known as pro homine principle).263 The
Realist trend is as promising as any local, regional, and national indigenous rights developments
in the United States and elsewhere. Moreover, it approximates Sen‘s ―Impartial Spectator‖
mechanism that seeks to minimize the influence of vested interest and eradicate the impact of
local parochialism. Mounting internal and external pressure for indigenous rights is the justicemaking encompassed within the capability-centered, land liberation vision.
Conclusion
Land liberation is an ages-old struggle against American colonialism. It is not an original
idea but one that is revitalized during a transitory period defined by justice. The new
contributions by long-time, East Indian, justice-seeker, Amartya Sen, may lead the human rights
movement into its twenty-first maturity, as American Indian pioneering intellectuals, like Robert
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Porter, attempt to place persisting American Indian tribes‘ justice demands into the human
rights‘ era context. This article explained receding political philosophy justice theories; discussed
their shared flaws with neo-liberalism and its demise; de-constructed Sen‘s emerging theory of
justice; fleshed out an iteration of the land liberation vision and implications; and finally, offered
a glimpse into concrete possibilities within the land liberation vision, toward the goal of situating
the two visions as ones that are directed toward similar—not competing—aims. For in the words
of one Native leader and Dene member, George Erasmus, ―The only thing that is going to
guarantee a new society is solidarity, allies who have a dialogue, who can learn from each
other.‖264
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